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CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST: HIS LAW-ANDORDER LEGACY AND IMPACT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Madhavi M. McCall* and Michael A. McCall**

I. INTRODUCTION
With the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist on September 3,
2005, an important chapter closed in American constitutional law.
Although the retirement of Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
announced early in the summer of 2005 ensured that the 2005-2006 U.S.
Supreme Court Term would differ from those before, the loss of the
Chief and the close of the Rehnquist Court further distinguishes this time
as an end of an era.1
Given his 19-year tenure as Chief Justice and 33-year career on the
Court, Justice Rehnquist left a profound mark on the Court and on
American politics more generally. In the months and years ahead,
scholars inevitably will employ various perspectives from which to
assess Rehnquist’s legacy. Some likely will focus on his affable style
and skills as a social leader on the Court;2 others may examine his
curious place in history as having presided over the impeachment of one
President3 while having helped another get elected by voting to halt a
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Associate Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University. B.A., 1989, Case Western
Reserve University; M.A., 1993, University of Akron; Ph.D., 1999, Washington University, St.
Louis.
**
Assistant Professor of Sociology, San Diego State University. B.A., 1989, University of Akron;
M.A., 1993, University of Akron; Ph.D., 2004, Washington University, St. Louis.
1. We recognize the dangers of depicting any Court, including the Rehnquist Court, as a
single, coherent era. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The ‘Rehnquist’
Court (?), 15 LAW AND COURTS 18 (2005). Indeed, changes over time are of considerable
importance in various places in this study.
2. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Former Rehnquist Clerks Recall His Wit, Warmth, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2005, at A13.
3. LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING
AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND CONSTRAINTS 644 (5th ed. 2004) (“Rehnquist’s research
and writing on federal impeachments proved propitious when he was called upon to preside over the
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recount of Florida ballots;4 and almost assuredly others will analyze the
impact of the Chief Justice in ways that perhaps are not yet fully
conceptualized. Whether these influences are cast as positive or
negative will continue, of course, to be the subject of much debate and
may, at times, depend to a considerable degree on one’s political views.
What is beyond most debates, however, is that Chief Justice Rehnquist
was a staunch conservative who cast votes and marshaled majorities for
decisions that reduced constitutional protections for the criminally
accused, rolled back federal powers, and streamlined federal appeals.5 It
seems an appropriate time to carefully and systematically analyze his
influence in such areas.
In terms of criminal justice issues, many undoubtedly will assess
Rehnquist’s tenure as a pendulum swing away from the more liberal
rulings of the Warren Court.6 Such evaluations might characterize
Rehnquist, and perhaps the Court more generally, as reflecting a broader
political movement toward a “law and order” or social control posture.7
This study is designed, in part, to measure the accuracy of such a
portrayal of Justice Rehnquist and to present some of the issue areas that
might prove particularly fruitful and appropriate for this type of
evaluation.
Regardless of the analytic approach, it would be unwise to assume
that Rehnquist’s effect was without limit. Ironically, and perhaps in part
a result of his battle with thyroid cancer at least in the last term, Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s influence may have weakened substantially near the
end of his career. For instance, long time Court watcher Linda
Greenhouse has described the 2003-2004 Supreme Court Term as the
year that Chief Justice Rehnquist “may have lost his court.”8 Indeed, in
the 2003-2004 Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the minority in a
1999 Senate impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton.”).
4. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Court
decided this controversial case 5-to-4. Id.
5. On rights of the accused, see EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3; on federalism, see
EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3; on habeas corpus petitions, see VICTOR E. FLANGO, HABEAS
CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1994).
6. For a quantitative summary of changes in decisions supporting the accused after the
Warren Court, see LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 166-68 (1994).
7. On the classic distinction and tension between the crime control/social order model and
the due process model of criminal justice (which are often held as reflecting the varying tendencies
in the Warren and Rehnquist Courts), see HERBERT S. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION (1968).
8. Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court. N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
2004, at A1.
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variety of high profile cases and his inability to muster a majority for
these cases in part prompted Greenhouse’s comments. Greenhouse
notes, for instance, that Rehnquist was unable to persuade a majority of
the other members that the President’s conduct during the war on
terrorism was constitutionally protected.9 Moreover, while Chief Justice
Rehnquist in prior terms repeatedly found his state’s rights position
garnering a majority ruling in federalism cases, in more recent years
,Justice O’Connor at times has voted against the Chief Justice.10 The
2003-2004 Term aside, Chief Justice Rehnquist was on the losing side in
some of the most controversial decisions of late including Lawrence v.
Texas,11 granting sexual rights to same-sex couples, Atkins v. Virginia,12
stating that the execution of mentally retarded individuals constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment, Grutter v. Bollinger,13 upholding a
continued need for affirmative action, Roper v. Simmons,14 finding that
the execution of individuals who commit capital offenses under the age
of 18 years constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and Rompilla v.
Beard,15 holding for only the third time in 20 years that a capital
defendant had received constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel.
Although Rehnquist found himself in the minority in some high
profile recent cases, his general federalism revolution and determination
to garner additional power for the federal courts have been relatively
successful.16 That is, while Rehnquist’s influence on the Court may
have declined in recent years, a broader review of cases from his tenure
spanning more than thirty years provides a more accurate picture of his
impact as both an Associate and Chief Justice.
In this article, we explore Chief Justice Rehnquist’s criminal justice
decisions through an empirical analysis of the Court’s decision-making
tendencies for the most recent natural court and a review of selected
criminal justice decisions written by Justice Rehnquist throughout his
career. To start, we limit the analysis, with only two exceptions, to
decisions actually written by Justice Rehnquist. Although Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in that position, had an important role in leading other
9. E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004);
and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
10. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
11. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
13. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
14. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
15. See Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (2005).
16. See Linda Greenhouse, The Last Days of the Rehnquist Court: The Rewards of Patience
and Power, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 251 (2003).
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justices to agree with him by assigning cases, we gleaned a substantial
amount of information regarding his decisional patterns and policy
preferences by analyzing the opinions he personally authored. The focus
of this inquiry, then, is Justice Rehnquist’s actual opinions and not his
votes in other cases. This empirical analysis is complemented and given
context by a discussion of the overall thrust of criminal justice cases
decided by the Court in the last decade.
A preliminary search of the Lexis/Nexis database indicates that
over his career, Justice Rehnquist wrote more than 250 decisions17
17. A Lexis/Nexis search originally produced a list of over 250 cases. We found that a
criminal justice issue was not central to some of the generated cases. In order to conduct this
analysis, we first read each case and determined which cases were principally related to a criminal
justice issue. While ultimately we did not include a specific discussion of many of the remaining
cases, we nevertheless created an initial list of criminal justice cases written by Justice Rehnquist
and used these cases in forming assessments and identifying the patterns suggested in this paper.
That list is: Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel, 406
U.S. 742 (1972); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972);
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Cupp v. Naughten,
414 U.S. 141 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Maze, 414
U.S. 395 (1974); California Bankers v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 430 (1974); Gooding v. United States, 416
U.S. 430 (1974); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433 (1974); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974);
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), overruled by United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82
(1978); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976);
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977);
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119
(1977); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978);
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367 (1979); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115
(1980); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981); Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Oregon v.
Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982); United States v. Valenzuela-bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982); Hewill v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), overruled by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); United States v. VillamonteMarquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); United States v. Rodgers, 466
U.S. 475 (1984); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253
(1984); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984);
Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984);
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Ponte v.
Real, 471 U.S. 491 (1985); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); Garrett v. United States,
471 U.S. 773 (1985); United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673 (1986); New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868 (1986); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986);
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); California v.
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dealing with criminal justices issues. In order to provide some
meaningful analysis, we examine only cases that deal with the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against illegal search and seizure, the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination, federalism as related
to criminal justice issues, and federal habeas corpus.18 Following this
Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551 (1987); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171 (1987); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58
(1988); United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681
(1988); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988);
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); Lockhard v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988); Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989); Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195
(1989); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344
(1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 110 (1990); Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990); Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248 (1991); Mu’Mi v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808
(1991); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Dawson v.
Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992); United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992); United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Herrera v. Collins,
506 U.S. 390 (1993); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619 (1993); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993);
Nat’l Org. For Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485
(1994); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994);
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Reno v. Koray,
515 U.S. 50 (1995); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690
(1996); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996); Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997); United States v.
Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997); McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997); Bracy v. Gramley,
520 U.S. 899 (1997); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269 (1998); United States v. Ramirez, 523
U.S. 65 (1998); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998); Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614 (1998); Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83
(1998); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000); Weeks v. Angelone, 528
U.S. 225 (2000); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753
(2000); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001);
Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774 (2001); Corr. Servs. Corps v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); United
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002); United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002); Scheidler v. NOW, 537
U.S. 393 (2003); Conn. Dept of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Demore v. Hyung Joon
Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S.
366 (2003); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); Thornton v. United States, 541
U.S. 615 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005);
Arthur Anderson v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004);
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004); and Pace v. Diguglielmo, 125 S.Ct. 1807 (2005).
18. Although not detailed in this examination, Rehnquist also wrote a number of interesting
double jeopardy and prisoner’s rights opinions. Consistent with his conservative leanings, most of
these cases were decided in a conservative manner. Indeed, we did not locate a single prisoner’s
rights case in which Rehnquist handed down a liberal decision.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 2
MCCALL1.DOC

328

4/26/2006 1:04:15 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:323

introduction, in Section II we provide a brief biographical sketch of
Justice Rehnquist’s education and career. We then analyze the criminal
justice decisions of the most recent Rehnquist Court using cases from
1995-2005 in Section III. This time frame captures Rehnquist’s last
natural court19 with the exception of the first term. Although Justice
Breyer–the last member to join the Court of interest here–served a full
term in 1994, we do not include the 1994-1995 Term to avoid the risk
that Breyer’s performance (and the Court’s more general decision
patterns) might have been distorted by the “freshman effect.”20 In
Section IV we extend the period under review and examine some of
Justice Rehnquist’s written opinions, both as an Associate Justice and as
Chief Justice. In the final section, we discuss the overall impact of
Justice Rehnquist’s decisions on criminal justice issues and revisit the
characterization of Rehnquist as central to a “law and order” shift.
II. BIOGRAPHY
Originally appointed by President Nixon in 1971 to replace Justice
John Harlan, Chief Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist served longer than
any other member of the current Court.21 Born in a suburb of
Milwaukee in 1924, Rehnquist was raised in Wisconsin and stayed there
until completing high school.22 After high school, Rehnquist entered
Kenyon College in Ohio23 for his Bachelor’s Degree, but World War II
interrupted his college years.24 He joined the Army Air Corps and later

19. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 689 (“The term natural court refers to a period of
time during which the membership of the Court remains stable.”). There were six natural courts
(identified as Rehnquist 1 through Rehnquist 6) under Chief Rehnquist. Id. These are: the Court as
of September 26, 1986 when Rehnquist took the oath to be Chief Justice (Justices Rehnquist,
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O’Connor, and Scalia), Rehnquist 2
(Kennedy replacing Powell), Rehnquist 3 (Souter replacing Brennan), Rehnquist 4 (Thomas
replacing Marshall), Rehnquist 5 (Ginsburg replacing White), and Rehnquist 6 (Breyer replacing
Blackmun). EPSTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH & WALKER, supra note 6.
20. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Christopher E. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and
Criminal Justice: An Empirical Assessment, 19 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 161 (2003).
21. Of current members, Justice Stevens has served the longest; Stevens came onto the Court
nearly four years after Rehnquist. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3. Justice Powell took his oath
to sit on the High Court the same day as Rehnquist (January 7, 1972). Id. Powell retired 18 years
before Rehnquist’s death. Id.
22. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, MADHAVI MCCALL & CYNTHIA PEREZ MCCLUSKEY, LAW AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 12 (2005).
23. Perhaps surprisingly, this small Ohio college also helped shape the minds of two other
Supreme Court justices, David Davis and Stanley Matthews. Both served on the Court during the
latter half of the 19th century. See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 678-83.
24. SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 12.
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used his GI bill to enter Stanford University to complete his Bachelors.25
Upon finishing his BA, Rehnquist earned masters degrees at both
Harvard University and Stanford University before enrolling in Stanford
Law School where he graduated first in his class in 1952 at the age of
twenty-seven.26 With an impressive law school career behind him,
Rehnquist garnered a prestigious clerkship for United States Supreme
Court Justice Robert Jackson.27 Rehnquist’s preference for conservative
rulings during his time with Justice Jackson is quite clear. At one point,
in a memo to Justice Jackson regarding the Supreme Court’s pending
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,28 Rehnquist argued that the
Court’s doctrine of “separate but equal” as articulated in the infamous
case of Plessey v. Ferguson29 should be upheld.30 It is a controversial
position,31 but illuminates Rehnquist’s beliefs on the role of government,
and potentially his opposition32 to certain liberal ideals. Indeed, as one
author notes,33 a few years after Rehnquist finished his clerkship, he
wrote an article for the U.S. News and World Report complaining that
Supreme Court clerks were predominantly liberal. This, according to
Rehnquist, often resulted in rulings that showed “extreme solitude for
the claims of Communists and other criminal defendants, expansion of
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The achievement is particularly impressive in that Rehnquist was a Stanford graduate
and the “coveted clerkships at the Supreme Court were then the province of the Ivy League law
schools.” David G. Savage, Chief Justice, 80, Led Court on a Conservative Path, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
4, 2005, at A21. Moreover, of the nine justices on the Court when Rehnquist joined, he was the
only one from a West coast law school. See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 678-83. All the
others were from Ivy League and/or eastern schools except for Chief Justice Burger, who was from
the University of Minnesota. Id. After Rehnquist’s death, Professor Richard Epstein reflected that
Rehnquist “was innately suspicious of the Ivy League mode of analysis that so often drives modern
constitutional scholarship.” Richard Epstein, Sidebars on Rehnquist and Roberts, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
11, 2005, at M3.
28. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. The memo became public during Rehnquist’s first confirmation hearing. Greenhouse,
supra note 16, at n. 41.
31. Id. at 257-58.
32. Before his confirmation, Rehnquist informed the Senate that he wrote the memo from
what he perceived to be Justice Jackson’s point of view. For a brief discussion of this and other
allegations then facing Rehnquist, see Adam Liptak, The Memo That Rehnquist Wrote and Had to
Disown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 5. Interesting parallels exist with the confirmation hearings
of John Roberts, Rehnquist’s successor. Roberts too felt obliged to state that arguments he made in
memos and elsewhere reflected the opinions of the administration he represented rather than his
own. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, By Invoking a Former Justice, the Nominee Says Much But
Gives Away Little, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at 24.
33. Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 257-58.
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federal power at the expense of State power, and great sympathy toward
any government regulation of business.”34 After completion of his
prestigious position as a Supreme Court clerk, Rehnquist went into
private practice in Phoenix, Arizona.35
While working in the private sector, Rehnquist became involved in
local politics and, specifically, in the workings of the Republican Party.36
Rehnquist’s role in the political party expanded just as the message of
“law and order” began to emerge as a major theme in national
elections.37 In 1964, Rehnquist served as a legal advisor to the then
ultra-conservative Arizona Senator and Republican presidential
nominee, Barry Goldwater.38 Prompted by urban rioting and other social
unrest, and finding himself far behind Lyndon Johnson in the polls,
Goldwater began to focus on a social order message that tapped the
concerns of many regarding crime and an expanding federal
government.39
Although Goldwater lost by one of the largest electoral margins in
presidential history,40 the “law and order” theme would continue as a
major electoral strategy. In 1968, and again in 1972, Nixon trumpeted
the need for crime control, the restoration of order, and changes in
policies that he saw as handcuffing the police and coddling prisoners.41
Nixon was especially critical of the judiciary, noting, “Some of our
courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace forces
as against the criminal forces.”42
Nixon culled Goldwater’s earlier campaign staff and, after the

34. Originally located in William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 13, 1957, at 74-75.
35. SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 12.
36. Id.
37. On the emergence of the “law and order” theme, see Michael McCall, Policing Levels and
Law and Order (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis) (on file
with Author); see generally ERIKA FAIRCHILD & VINCENT WEBB, THE POLITICS OF CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1985).
38. SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 12.
39. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS (1983); SMITH, MCCALL &
MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 43-53; THEODORE WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT
1964 (1965). Interestingly, in this position of campaign advisor, Rehnquist revealed another
tendency that would come to characterize his tenure on the Court–giving primacy to states’ rights.
Rehnquist “urged Goldwater to oppose the landmark civil rights bill before Congress, saying it
marked an unwise expansion of federal authority over local matters.” Savage, supra note 27, at A21.
40. SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 97.
41. MCCALL 2004, supra note 37, at 54-58.
42. Richard M. Nixon, 1968 Presidential Nominee Acceptance Speech, Republican
Convention, Miami Beach, transcribed into pamphlet by the Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee
(Aug. 8, 1968).
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election, appointed Rehnquist to serve as an Assistant Attorney General,
placing him in charge of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel–the constitutional law arm of the Justice Department.43 As a
member of the Justice Department, Rehnquist was often called upon to
defend the Nixon Administration in court.44 During these years
Rehnquist, like Nixon, was very vocal in his criticism of the Warren
Court’s liberal decisions, arguing that the Warren Court had overstepped
its bounds and had engaged in judicial activism beyond constitutional
mandate.45 Rehnquist’s work for the Justice Department and his support
of conservative philosophies eventually led to his nomination by
President Nixon to the High Court in 1971.46 As Nixon’s fourth and
final Supreme Court appointment,47 Rehnquist was also considered “the
one who best lived up to Nixon’s pledge to name “law and order”
conservatives to the bench.”48 The Senate confirmed Rehnquist in a 6826 vote as the 100th jurist to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court.49
When Justice Warren Burger retired in 1986 from the Chief Justice
position, President Ronald Reagan nominated Rehnquist to the position
of Chief.50 The proposed elevation forced another Senate confirmation,
and although Rehnquist was confirmed, his Senate confirmation vote
was the closest in American history for an individual nominated to the
position of Chief Justice.51 Civil rights and civil liberties groups heavily
President Reagan submitted Rehnquist’s
opposed Rehnquist.52
nomination for the Chief Justice position simultaneously with that of
Justice Antonin Scalia for the Associate Justice position.53 The timing
of the two nominations proved advantageous for President Reagan.
Rehnquist’s controversial nomination for Chief Justice took so much of

43. SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 12.
44. Id.
45. While it is beyond the scope of this inquiry to determine how Rehnquist came to form his
viewpoints, it is clear that throughout his career as a lawyer and as a member of the Republican
Party he tended to hold strongly conservative convictions. See generally Greenhouse, supra note
16.
46. SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 12.
47. Justices Burger, Blackmun, and Powell were also appointed by Nixon. See EPSTEIN &
WALKER, supra note 3, at 678-83.
48. Savage, supra note 27, at A20.
49. The number of justices to this point is calculated from data in Epstein & Walker, supra
note 3, at 678-83, and Savage, supra note 27.
50. SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 12.
51. Rehnquist was confirmed as Chief Justice by a 65-33 vote. EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra
note 3, at 681.
52. See id. at 678-83; MCCALL 2005, supra note 22, at 12.
53. SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 14.
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the Senate’s time that it made Scalia’s confirmation hearings relatively
quick and smooth. Consequently, Reagan was able to elevate Rehnquist
with some difficulty, but also was able to place the extremely
conservative Justice Scalia on the Court against surprisingly limited
objections.54
III. DECISION TRENDS ON THE REHNQUIST COURT, 1995-2005
A member of the High Court since 1971, Chief Justice Rehnquist
sat on the Court longer than almost any other member in history55 and
served as Chief Justice longer than anyone in about a century.56 His
lengthy tenure allowed him to see the Court’s majority adopt many of
his preferences limiting the Warren Court’s decisions.
To evaluate and make meaningful generalizations regarding the
decision-making tendencies of the most recent natural court, we present
in this section, an empirical analysis of criminal justice cases decided by
the Rehnquist Court during the 1995-2005 Terms. We use the label
“liberal” to describe a philosophy that favors expanding rights for
individuals in a criminal justice context and “conservative” to describe
decisions in criminal justice that tend to prefer the government’s position
related to prosecuting and punishing offenders over the recognition
and/or expansion of individual rights for the criminally accused.57 Since
Rehnquist’s appointment to the Chief position in 1986, the Court
consistently has been labeled a conservative court, and it held generally
that most of the Rehnquist Court justices are conservative and rule for

54. See, e.g., accounts available at http://www.oyez.org (Scalia Biography) and www.pbs.org
(Newshour, Supreme Court Watch, Scalia).
55. William Douglas served longer (36 years, 7 months) than any other Justice in history. See
EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 678-83. Other leaders in this category include, in order of
length of service, Stephen Field (34 years, 7 months), John Marshall (34 years, 5 months), Hugo
Black (34 years, 1 month), John Harlan I (33 years, 10 months), William Brennan (33 years, 9
months), and William Rehnquist (33 years, 8 months). Id. Brennan’s actual service was slightly
longer than indicated because he received a recess appointment.
56. At 19 years, the Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) is the fourth longest in Supreme Court
history. The longest tenures of a Chief Justice are John Marshall (1801-1835), Roger Taney (18361864), and Melville Fuller (1888-1910). See EPSTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH & WALKER, supra note 6, at
Table 5-2.
57. Here, we use the definitions advanced in the Supreme Court Judicial Database in which
“[l]iberal decisions in the area of civil liberties are pro-person accused or convicted of a crime, procivil liberties or civil rights claimant, pro-indigent, pro-[Native American], and anti-government in
due process and privacy.” Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren
and Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 103
(1989).
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law enforcement on criminal justice issues.58 Unlike the earlier liberal
decisions of the Warren Court, the Rehnquist Court has been “active in
narrowing or overturning many Warren and Burger Court precedents
that were favorable to the rights” of the criminally accused.59 Here, we
conduct only a broad analysis of the Court’s decisional tendencies.60
The examination confirms that the Court indeed rendered conservative
decisions in a wide-range of criminal justice issues,61 although we note
that liberal decisions are also evident.62
First, we found that a large portion of the Court’s docket concerned
issues related to the criminal justice system. Generally, for the time
frame of this analysis, thirty to forty percent of the Court’s full decisions
each term were cases dealing with criminal justice issues.63 Although
judicial scholars tend to focus on the Court’s rulings dealing with broad,
constitutional principles, we find that the Court handed down almost as
many statutory decisions during this time frame as constitutional ones.
From 1995-2005, the Court decided 151 criminal justice cases primarily
raising a constitutional issue and 130 cases raising a nonconstitutional
(statutory or other) issue.64 Despite the image of the Court as the
ultimate protectors of constitutional rights, in the last decade the
Supreme Court has heard only a relatively modest number of criminal
justice constitutional cases. Among these constitutional cases, we find
that the Court was most likely to choose and decide Fourth Amendment
cases between 1995-2005. Among statutory issues, the Court was most
active in cases involving habeas corpus relief. This emphasis, as
discussed later, is not surprising given the efforts by Justice Rehnquist to
lead the Court in a direction that would limit opportunities for convicted
58. In the Court of interest here, the conservatives are Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy,
and O’Connor, while the liberals are Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter.
59. See JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND EVOLVING
STANDARDS OF DECENCY 183 (2001). While a conservative, Burger is most likely included in this
quote because he led a fractured Court that produce some famous, liberal decisions.
60. Regarding the analysis and discussion of case distribution by vote, see infra note 66 and
Table 1, we code those criminal justice cases previously identified. See Smith, supra note 20, at
161. Then, we update that analysis for the final years under review here from 2000-2005.
61. Criminal justice-related cases are broadly defined for the purposes of this analysis,
including cases concerning statutory and constitutional interpretations of laws and cases dealing
with civil rights litigation affecting individuals working in the criminal justice system. Each case
outcome is then classified as liberal or conservative.
62. For related analyses, see Smith, supra note 20, at 161.
63. See id. (explaining why the Court takes and decides such a large number of criminal
justice cases in any given year).
64. The ratio of cases raising constitutional to nonconstitutional issues varies considerably
from term to term. Christopher E. Smith, Michael McCall, & Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice
and the 2003-2004 United States Supreme Court Term, 35 N.M. L. REV.123, 128-130 (2005).
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offenders to use the federal judiciary to challenge their convictions.65
Second, consistent with conventional wisdom, we find that indeed
Rehnquist’s Court generated a large number of conservative decisions.
As depicted in Table 1, the Court handed down considerably more
conservative decisions in this time frame than it did liberal ones.

TABLE 1
Case Distribution by Vote and Liberal-Conservative Outcome in
U. S. Supreme Court Criminal Justice Decisions, 1995-2005
Vote66
9-to-0 and 8-to-1 decisions

Liberal
47

Conservative
78

7-to-2 decisions

15

22

37

6-to-3 and 5-to-4 decisions

47

72

119

Total

109 (38.8%)

172 (61.2%)

Total
125

281

Such figures strongly justify the Court’s reputation for ruling in a
conservative manner. The Court ruled against the interest of the accused
in more than three of every five criminal justice cases it decided since
1995. However, the Court also handed down a significant number of
liberal decisions. Indeed, 38% of the cases that were either unanimous
or had only one dissenter were decided in a liberal manner (47 of 125
cases). Moreover, of those closely divided and heavily contested cases
with either three or four dissenters, the Court also rendered liberal
decisions nearly 40% of the time (47 of 119 cases).67 While the
conservative tendencies of the Court remain unmistakable, it is not the
case that the Court only handed down liberal decisions in relatively
65. See infra Section IV(D) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence).
66. Because Chief Rehnquist did not participate in some cases in the 2004-2005 Term, some
categories include decisions with the indicated number of dissents but one less in the majority. For
instance, a 7-to-1 vote would be included with 8-to-1 cases for purposes of the table. See also
Smith, supra note 20 at 170 (detailing comparable statistics for the 1995 through 2000 term of the
Supreme Court).
67. In the most recent terms, this figure is higher still. Combining the 2003-2004 and 20042005 Terms, the Court delivered 32 criminal justice decisions with either 3 or 4 dissenters each.
Half of these cases were decided with a conservative opinion, while in the other 16 cases the
Court’s opinion is categorized as liberal.
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controversy-free cases.
Given the presence of four justices on this Court widely believed to
hold a liberal orientation (Justices Breyer, Souter, Stevens and
Ginsburg), it is obvious that to produce a liberal majority one of the
conservative justices must provide a swing vote to the liberal bloc.
Interestingly, especially given the emphasis of this paper, those liberal
swing votes have been provided by all members of the conservative bloc
except Chief Justice Rehnquist.68 In thirteen 5-to-4 criminal justice
cases from 1995-2000 with a liberal outcome, Justice O’Connor
provided a liberal vote in four cases, Justice Kennedy provided a liberal
vote in four cases, Justice Scalia provided a liberal vote in four cases and
Justice Thomas provided a liberal vote in five cases.69 Our updated
analysis shows that this unique characteristic of Rehnquist continues for
all ten terms under consideration here. While Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy are often considered to be potential swing voters, the fact that
even Justices Thomas and Scalia could be counted as having provided
liberal votes in such divided cases but Justice Rehnquist could not is
noteworthy. This is especially interesting given that Justices Scalia,
Thomas and Rehnquist supported liberal claims in criminal justice cases
at fairly similar rates.70 Examining votes in all criminal justice cases71
decided (1995 Term through the 2005 Term), Rehnquist voted
conservatively 75.2% of the time—slightly more often than Thomas
(74.4%) and Scalia (71.5%).72 This ranking of conservative tendencies
is rather consistent across the period.73 Overall, the Court’s voting
patterns in criminal justice cases from 1995-2005 indicate that, while the
Court tended to render conservative decisions, the justices also handed
down liberal decisions.74 However, in the most contested liberal

68. See Smith, supra note 20.
69. These votes do not add up to 13 because in some cases, a “liberal” justice voted
conservative. A liberal decision in such cases required more than one conservative justice to vote in
a liberal direction.
70. Smith, supra note 20 at 171.
71. Because Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate in certain criminal justice cases
during the 2004-2005 Term, his total number of criminal justice cases (274) is slightly lower than
the 281 votes cast by both Scalia and Thomas.
72. Smith, supra note 20 at 170. Smith’s results were updated by the authors for the Court’s
most recent term.
73. For example, Smith finds that Justice Rehnquist supported liberal claims in 26.1% of
criminal justice cases between 1995-2000; Justice Thomas supported liberal claims in 27.9% of
criminal cases; and Justice Scalia supported liberal claims in 30.9% of criminal cases. Smith, supra
note 20. Stevens ruled liberal in 69% of these cases - more often than any other Justice, followed by
Ginsburg. Id. at 171.
74. See Table 1 supra.
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decisions, Rehnquist did not play the critical swing role that other
conservative justices did.75
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS WRITTEN BY JUSTICE REHNQUIST
A. Fourth Amendment Protection From Illegal Search and Seizure
Given the frequency of Fourth Amendment cases before the Court
in recent decades76 and in most terms,77 Rehnquist had numerous
opportunities to affect the proscribed limits on police behavior. In many
of these instances, as both Chief Justice and as an Associate Justice,
Rehnquist actively restricted the reach of the Fourth Amendment
protection from illegal search and seizure and created exceptions to the
Exclusionary Rule.78 While it is not surprising given his ideological
tendencies that he ruled conservatively in most Fourth Amendment
cases, it is interesting to note that in recent years, Rehnquist was unable
to bring along the rest of the conservatives in certain significant cases.79
As some Court observers note, while Rehnquist voted the majority in all
but five Fourth Amendment cases heard by the recent natural court
(1994-2004), four of those cases the Court were sharply divided and
handed down liberal decisions.80 Chief Justice Rehnquist cast dissenting
votes in each of these four cases.81 Some report that Rehnquist had
moved so far to the right82 in recent years that his influence on the
75. Information compiled by authors and, for all Court terms except the cases litigated during
the 2004-2005 Term, verified through data found in SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY, 2005, supra
note 22, at 29; and Smith, McCall and McCall 2005, supra note 64, at 151-159.
76. See Smith, supra note 20, at 166 (noting the extent to which the Court hears search and
seizure cases, and why the Court is inclined to rule in this area).
77. Of recent terms, the 2002-2003 Term is somewhat unusual for the absence of a Supreme
Court decision on a major search and seizure issue. See Smith & McCall, Criminal Justice and the
2002-2003 United States Supreme Court Term, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 859 (2004).
78. See Paula C. Arledge & Edward V. Heck, Votes and Opinions in Fourth Amendment
Cases, 1994-2004: Is it Rehnquist’s Court?, Paper prepared for the Southwestern Political Science
Association Annual Meetings, New Orleans, Louisiana (Mar. 23-26, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors). Note that this study includes the first term of the natural court but
does not include data regarding the Court’s last term. Our update reveals that Rehnquist continued
to be absent from a 5-4 liberal majority in 2004-2005.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The cases are Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); and Groh v. Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551 (2004).
82. Of course, it is possible that Rehnquist did not “move to the right” but rather that others,
such as Justice O’Connor, moved to the left. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, & Lee
Epstein, A Multidisciplinary Exploration: The Median Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, 83 N.C.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss2/2

14

McCall and McCall: The Criminal Law Jurisprudence of Chief Justice William Rehnquist
MCCALL1.DOC

2006]

4/26/2006 1:04:15 PM

THE CRIMINAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST

337

moderate conservatives had waned.83 In this section and in part to assess
his influence, we review some of the major Fourth Amendment cases
written by Justice Rehnquist over his career.84
1. Decisions Written While Associate Justice
Very early in Rehnquist’s career on the High Court, Justice
Rehnquist handed down a Fourth Amendment opinion that would
predict fairly well his views on the Fourth Amendment for the rest of his
career. In United States v. Robinson (1973),85 a six-member Court
majority concluded that a warrantless search incident to a lawful,
custodial arrest and consistent with established department policy did
not violate the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.86 Rehnquist
held that even absent concern for personal safety, and officer could
conduct a full search of the individual pursuant to a lawful arrest,
including traffic arrests.87 Rehnquist noted that police were not bound
by the stop-and-frisk standards used when the police stop merely an
individual for investigative purposes.88 The arrest itself established the
officer’s authority to search the defendant, discovering the heroin
concealed in his pocket. Consequently, the Court created an exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment for a search incident
to a lawful, custodial arrest.89
In a companion case, Gustafson v. Florida,90 Rehnquist and the
majority extended the logic of Robinson to cases where there was no

L. REV. 1275 (2005). Of importance is the apparent gap between Rehnquist and other conservatives
on the Court and how this gap seemed to widen in recent years.
83. See Greenhouse, supra note 8.
84. Beyond those cases covered here, Rehnquist also authored Fourth Amendment opinions in
New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 868 (1986); Immigration and Naturalization Service et al. v.
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez et al., 462 U.S. 579 (1983);
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21
(1974); Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974); Scott et al. V. United States, 436 U.S. 128
(1978); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989);
Ornelas and Ornelas-Ledesma v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) and United States v. Hernan
Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998).
85. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
86. Id. at 236-37. Defendant Robinson was under a lawful, custodial arrest when the arresting
officer conducted a full search of Robinson’s person and found heroin capsules in his coat pocket.
Id. at 221. The officer did not indicate that he was conducting a safety search and did not indicate
any belief that Robinson was carrying a weapon. Id. at 222.
87. Id. at 224.
88. Id. at 227.
89. Id. at 225.
90. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
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existing department policy regarding searches pursuant to an arrest.91
The rulings indicate Rehnquist’s proclivity to reduce limits on police
authority. Although he would not further the reach of Robinson several
years later to warrantless searches of cars pursuant to an arrest in
Knowles v. Iowa,92 Robinson is an early indication of Rehnquist’s
conservative philosophies that continued throughout his career.
Shortly following the decision in Robinson, Rehnquist again
displayed his preference for reducing limits on police activity in his
majority opinion in Adams v. Williams (1972).93 The Supreme Court
upheld the validity of this informant—prompted search despite the
dissenters asserting that the state had not shown a sufficient cause to
justify the stop in the first place.94 Rehnquist’s majority opinion instead
held that the informant’s tip was sufficiently reliable to justify the stop,
that the officer’s subsequent actions were justifiable to ensure his safety,
and that probable cause existed for the arrest.95 Interestingly, Rehnquist
would also write the Court’s opinion in Illinois v. Gates96 several years
later in which the Court articulated a “totality of circumstances”
argument that increased police flexibility in the use of tips.97
Rehnquist’s preference for expanding police discretion and limiting
the reach of the exclusionary rule is further evident in United States v.
Peltier (1975).98 Peltier appealed for the exclusion of the marijuana
found in his vehicle because the officers did not have probable cause to
stop him.99 While Peltier was pending, the Supreme Court held in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States (1973)100 that warrantless searches of
vehicles conducted near the border without probable cause were
unconstitutional.101 Rehnquist concluded that Almeida-Sanchez would
91. See id.
92. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
93. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Based on a tip by a person familiar to a police
officer, the officer approached a parked car and uncovered a loaded gun upon reaching inside the
open window. Id. at 148-49. The officer arrested Williams for carrying a concealed a weapon, even
though the weapon had not been visible from outside the car.
94. See id. (upholding validity of a search).
95. Id. at 148.
96. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1982).
97. See infra notes 143-147 and accompanying text (discussing in detail this “totality of the
circumstances” standard).
98. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). The border patrol stopped Peltier and
searched his vehicle. Id. at 532. During the search, border patrol agents found hundreds of pounds
of marijuana. Id.
99. Id.
100. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
101. Rehnquist dissented from the majority holding in Almeida-Sanchez. Id. at 287-99
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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not be applied retroactively to Peltier’s appeal because the agents were
acting in accordance with then—current federal statutes.102 The purpose
of the exclusionary rule as Rehnquist interpreted it—to discourage
unlawful police conduct—did not apply here because the police, to the
best of their knowledge, had acted lawfully.103 Consistent with most of
his exclusionary rule decisions, Rehnquist found that the provision is
necessary if the police have acted improperly, but not if a defendant’s
constitutional rights have been violated in the absence of police
misconduct.104 That is, it is not the violation of a person’s constitutional
rights that triggers the exclusionary rule, but rather the police activity
that leads to the constitutional violation.105 This police activity can be
misconduct or the result of a lack of explicit department procedures
regulating police activity.106 Indeed, Rehnquist’s majority opinion in
United States v. Ceccolini (1977)107 supports this conclusion. In
Ceccolini, the Court concluded that illegally obtained evidence was
admissible during a defendant’s perjury trial in part because the
application of the exclusionary rule would not deter police behavior.108
Further indication of Rehnquist’s predilection to allow greater
police discretion is evident in United States v. Santana (1976).109 In
Santana, the police attempted a warrantless arrest of defendant Santana
because they had probable cause to believe that she had committed a
drug offense.110 Santana moved to have the drugs and money that police
found in a search of her home suppressed as evidence.111 Writing for the
majority, Rehnquist found that because probable cause existed to make a
warrantless arrest and because Santana was in a public place–the
doorway of her residence–when the police first attempted to arrest her,
the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they made the
warrantless search in her home.112 Moreover, although the actual arrest
and subsequent search occurred in Santana’s home, a private place, the
102. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 532, 537.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 537-38.
105. Id. at 539.
106. Compare Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) with Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1
(1990).
107. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1977).
108. Id. at 280.
109. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
110. Id. at 39-40. Santana stood in the doorway of her home and, upon police confrontation,
retreated to inside the vestibule of her home. Id. at 40. The police followed and seized money and
drugs that Santana was carrying. Id. at 41.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 43.
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police were in “hot pursuit” and thus could enter her home to make the
arrest without a warrant.113 As such, the arrest and search were legal
under the Fourth Amendment, justified ultimately because the police
were in “hot pursuit.”
In 1977, Rehnquist and the majority allowed the warrantless search
of international mail in United States v. Ramsey (1977).114 In Ramsey, a
U.S. customs official opened suspicious envelopes originating in
Thailand without a warrant and found heroine.115 Some of the
individuals connected to the mail were apprehended, prosecuted, and
convicted for drug offenses.116 A U.S. Appeals Court suppressed the
evidence and reversed the convictions, arguing that the Fourth
Amendment did not allow the search of international mail without
probable cause and without a search warrant.117 Rehnquist reversed,
holding principally that the search of international mail fell under the
border exception to the Fourth Amendment and thus searches absent
probable cause or a warrant were nevertheless constitutional.118 The
search was also legal under U.S. laws governing the conduct of customs
officials that authorize an official to act on reasonable suspicion of
illegal activity.119
In addition to limiting the scope of the exclusionary rule and
favoring increases in police discretion, Justice Rehnquist’s decisions
also tend to reveal a preference for limited privacy rights under the
Fourth Amendment. For instance, Rehnquist’s opinion in United States
v. Knotts (1982) 120 found that law enforcement officials do not violate
individuals’ constitutional rights when they plant radio transmitters in
containers and track the movements of those containers.121 In Knotts,
Government officials placed radio transmitters inside a chloroform
container.122 When the container was purchased, law enforcement
113. Id.
114. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). Rehnquist also found that reasonable
suspicion is sufficient to stop for investigatory purposes suspected couriers at airports in United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
115. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 609. A United States custom official at a New York post office
noticed eight bulky envelopes from Thailand addressed to Washington D.C. Id. The official was
aware that Thailand is a frequent source of illegal narcotics and the envelopes felt heavier than
regular airmail. Id.
116. Id. at 610.
117. Id. at 611.
118. Id. at 617.
119. Id. at 614.
120. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1982).
121. Id. at 277.
122. Id. at 278.
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followed the radio transmissions to a cabin and upon securing a search
warrant, discovered a drug laboratory.123 The defendants sought to have
the evidence suppressed, arguing that the government had violated their
Fourth Amendment rights.124 The defendants asserted that they had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and the warrantless monitoring of the
chloroform container violated that privacy expectation.125 Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, concluded that in fact the placement of
monitoring devices in the container did not constitute a search, and
therefore, Fourth Amendment protections did not apply.126 Moreover,
the defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because
the government surveillance resulted in nothing more than the police
following a car on the public streets.127 There is no expectation of
privacy that police will not observe a vehicle when traveling on public
roads.128 The majority found no difference between visual surveillance
and the police’s use of audio monitoring devices here.129 Clearly, Justice
Rehnquist believed that individuals have no privacy expectation from
government use ofelectronic surveillance130 to monitor the movement of
items, at least in these circumstances and with this technology.131 Justice
Rehnquist authored an opinion in an earlier privacy ruling in 1980,
holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy regarding their
personal property in the purse of another individual.132 With the consent
of the purse owner, a warrantless search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.133
123. Id. at 279-80.
124. Id. at 279.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 284-85.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 285.
129. Id. at 284-85.
130. Rehnquist’s dissenting vote in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) shows similar
logic, as he voted to find that the use of thermal imagers do not constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment because individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the heat
emanating from their home. The rulings in United States v. Knotts and much more recently in Kyllo
are important indicators of his views on technological surveillance. These decisions suggest that
Rehnquist was quite willing to apply advanced technologies to the monitoring of criminal activities.
Kyllo is one of five close Fourth Amendment cases ending in a liberal outcome and decided by the
last Rehnquist natural court (1994-2005). Rehnquist dissented in Kyllo and in each of the remaining
four cases.
131. For more discussion on the application of the Fourth Amendment to technological
advancements and the impact of technology on criminal justice, see SMITH, MCCALL &
MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 12; Christopher E. Smith and Madhavi McCall, Constitutional
Rights and Technological Innovations in Criminal Justice, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 103 (2002).
132. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980).
133. Id. at 98.
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As noted earlier, Rehnquist wrote the opinion in a major Fourth
Amendment case, Illinois v. Gates (1983).134 This opinion articulated a
new standard for determining the appropriateness of police use of an
anonymous tip.135 Acting on an anonymous tip, the police chief, in
concert with the Drug Enforcement Agency, arranged surveillance of the
Gates as they made an alleged drug run.136 The police eventually
obtained a search warrant for the Gates’ possession and found hundreds
of pounds of drugs.137 The state appellate courts suppressed the
evidence, holding that the anonymous tip did not pass the two-prong test
established in Aguilar v. Texas (1964)138 and Spinelli v. United States
(1969)139 for the use of information from an anonymous source.140
The United States Supreme Court reversed, with Rehnquist
concluding for the majority that the two-prong test established in
Aguilar141 and Spinelli142 was unworkable and replacing it with a
“totality of circumstances” test.143 In Aguilar and Spinelli, the High
Court had determined that an anonymous tip was usable if the police
could verify the informant’s “basis of knowledge” and if the informant
could provide sufficient facts to establish the “veracity” or the
“reliability” of the informant’s information.144 Rehnquist and the
majority determined that the two-prong test was too restrictive and rigid
and that it unnecessarily limited the police’s ability to apprehend
criminals.145 By replacing this with a totality of circumstances test, the
Court held that the officer is constitutionally able to use an anonymous
tip if he or she finds that the sum total of the informant’s information is
reliable, even if specific elements as required in Aguilar and Spinelli are
134. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1982).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 226. The case started in 1978 after the Bloomingdale (Illinois) Police Department
received an anonymous tip asserting that Lance and Susan Gates were drug dealers. Id. at 225. The
letter continued with a description of the Gates’ drug dealing activities, including where they
obtained their drugs and how they transported those items. Id. The police chief then confirmed
certain elements of the tip including that persons by the name of Gates resided at the stated address.
Id. at 226.
137. Id.
138. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983).
139. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213 (1983).
140. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227-29 (1983).
141. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 108.
142. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 410.
143. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231-32.
144. Id. at 232-34.
145. Id. at 233-38.
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not present.146 The case represents another move by Rehnquist and the
conservative majority to allow greater police discretion in the
apprehension of criminals. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s early views on the
Fourth Amendment are clear: while search and seizure rights are
protected by the Constitution, the protections should not deter
“legitimate” police work.147
2. Decisions written while Chief Justice
As Chief Justice, Rehnquist’s preference for increasing police
power and discretion continues to be evident in several of his written
opinions. Indeed, a reading of these cases reveals that the Chief
Justice’s personal preferences tend to fall on the far side of the
conservative spectrum. This pattern is so strong that, during the most
recent natural court, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not provide the swing
vote in a single criminal justice case much less a Fourth Amendment
case.148 The four liberal members of this natural court–Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens–could rely on one of the other
conservative justices (Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy, and O’Connor) to
provide an occasional liberal vote to create a liberal majority decision.
Only Chief Justice Rehnquist, during this natural court, failed to provide
a single liberal vote in a close criminal justice case.
We start the discussion of the Chief Justice’s Fourth Amendment
cases with Colorado v. Bertine (1987),149 one of Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s many car search opinions.
Bertine addressed the
constitutionality of searching, without a warrant, a closed backpack
during an inventory search of an impounded vehicle.150 Bertine argued
that the court should suppress the narcotics found in his backpack

146. Id. at 237-38.
147. Rehnquist’s definition of legitimate police work tended to be broader than that envisioned
by the earlier Warren Court. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT 7 (1997). For example, six of the nine justices serving on the Warren Court in 1968
decided in favor of individuals in at least seventy percent of criminal justice cases. Id. For some
basic comparisons of case law and general tendencies of the two Courts, see OTIS H. STEPHENS &
JOHN M. SCHEB II, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Chapter 10 (2nd ed. 1999).
148. Smith, supra note 20. Smith’s data has been updated by the Authors to include the
Supreme Court’s statistics through 2005.
149. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
150. Id. at 368. Police arrested Bertine for driving under the influence and impounded his van.
Id. During the course of an inventory search, the police opened a closed backpack and several other
closed containers consistent with department policy requiring that they open closed containers and
list the contents. Id. at 369-70. The police found drugs in the backpack and prosecuted Bertine on
narcotics charges. Id. at 370.
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because the warrantless inventory search violated the Fourth
Amendment.151 Bertine contended that the police simply should have
noted the closed backpack on the vehicle inventory.152 Rehnquist’s
majority opinion held that reasonable police inventory procedures
conducted in good faith satisfied the Fourth Amendment.153 Moreover,
the majority noted that there was no evidence of bad faith or intention to
investigate the backpack and the police had adhered to department
policy.154 Again Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to discount the
possibility of violations of individual rights provided there is no
evidence of police misconduct.
The ruling in Bertine turns on the fact that the police department
had specific policies in place regulating the treatment of closed
containers during an inventory search. In contrast, the Court identified a
Fourth Amendment violation in Florida v. Wells.155 Wells moved to
suppress the evidence police found during a warrantess inventory search
of his vehicle, and the Supreme Court agreed.156 Writing for the
majority, Rehnquist found that because there was a lack of any policy
regarding the treatment of closed containers during an inventory search
of a car, the search was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment.157 Again, the emphasis is on the regulation (or lack
thereof) of police activity and not simply whether a search inherently
violates the defendant’s rights. Here, the lack of department procedures
resulted in an unconstitutional search, suggesting that merely having
police procedures in place might satisfy constitutional standards. The
fact that the search itself was conducted without a warrant is less
relevant.
The concentration on the reasonableness of police action is evident
in the Court’s conservative decision in Ohio v. Robinette (1996).158
Reviewing a consensual search of a stopped vehicle, the Ohio Supreme
151. Id. at 369.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 376-77.
154. Id. at 372.
155. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990). Police stopped Wells for speeding and after the
officer smelled alcohol on the defendant’s breath, arrested Wells for driving under the influence. Id.
at 2. Wells agreed to go with the trooper to the station for a Breathalyzer test and also allowed the
trooper to open the trunk of the car. Id. The car was impounded. Id. During a warrantless inventory
search, the trooper directed that a locked suitcase found in the trunk be forcefully opened, though no
departmental policy compelled the trooper to take such action. Id. at 2-3. Police found a substantial
quantity of marijuana in the suitcase. Id. at 2.
156. Id. at 3.
157. Id. at 5.
158. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
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Court overturned the related conviction, arguing that officers must
inform suspects that they have a right to leave before conducting a
search.159 The United States Supreme Court reversed with Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion rejecting an absolute requirement that
individuals be told they have a right to leave.160 The measure of
importance was not whether or not a suspect knew he or she had a right
to leave, but rather if the officer’s actions were reasonable.161 Similarly,
the Court ruled in Arizona v. Evans (1995)162 that the Fourth
Amendment did not require the suppression of evidence found when the
police base their actions on a clerical mistake by court employees.163
In yet another case dealing with the scope of police searches in the
context of a traffic violation, the majority found in Florida v. Jimeno164
that a police officer’s opening of a closed paper bag during a consent
search of a defendant’s car did not violate the Fourth Amendment.165
The defendant argued to suppress the evidence because, while he
consented to a search of the car, he did not consent to a search of the
closed bag.166 The High Court disagreed, finding the search permissible
under the Fourth Amendment.167 Writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the defendant’s rights were not violated
because he gave consent to search the car and reasonably should have
expected the officer to look in containers that might contain drugs,
especially after being told of the officer’s suspicions.168 Moreover, the
officer was within his right to conclude that the consent to search had
extended to the bag because narcotics generally are transported in some

159. Id. at 36. An officer caught Robert Robinette driving 69 miles per hour in a 45 MPH
zone. Id. Upon stopping Robinette and running his license, the officer found no citations or
outstanding warrants. Id. The officer first issued a verbal warning, returned Robinette’s license,
and then asked if Robinette had any illegal drugs or weapons in the car. Id. Robinette answered
“no,” and the officer asked to conduct a search, to which Robinette agreed. Id. The officer found a
small amount of narcotics, and Robinette eventually did not contest the charges and was found
guilty. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 39-40.
162. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
163. Id.
164. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
165. Id. at 249. Upon stopping defendant Jimeno for a traffic violation, the officer told Jimeno
that the officer believed that Jimeno was carrying drugs and asked to search the car. Id. Jimeno
agreed to a search of the car, and the officer found a closed paper bag on the floor of the car. Id.
The officer opened the bag and found cocaine. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 249.
168. Id. at 252.
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sort of container.169
Rehnquist, of course, did not endorse unrestricted search discretion
for police. In Knowles v. Iowa (1998),170 Rehnquist and a unanimous
court refused to extend the logic of his decision in United States v.
Robinson (1973)171 to full car searches absent consent and an arrest
warrant.172 In Knowles,173 Rehnquist held that a police officer could not
conduct a full search of the car under the “search incident to arrest”
exception because neither of the two historical justifications–the need to
disarm a suspect in order to take the suspect into custody and the need to
preserve evidence–existed in this case.174 The case is a rare instance in
which Rehnquist wrote a relatively major liberal decision.175 Rehnquist
and the unanimous Court were unwilling to allow police discretion to
conduct full auto searches following mere traffic citations.176
Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in another traffic-stop
Fourth Amendment case, Maryland v. Pringle.177 The Court held that a
police officer had probable cause to arrest all persons in a car in which
drugs and money had been found.178 Individualized suspicion regarding
which of the occupants owned the money and drugs was not
necessary.179 Justice Rehnquist found that the police had probable cause
to stop the car and to believe a crime had or was being committed.180
Given this and the large quantity of narcotics and cash, it was reasonable
for the officer to conclude that any or all of the car’s occupants knew of
169. Id.
170. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
171. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
172. See Knowles, 525 U.S. at 113. In Robinson, the Chief Justice had concluded that searches
of persons upon a custodial arrest were constitutionally permissible. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 218.
173. Here, an Iowa police officer issued a traffic citation to Knowles. Knowles, 525 U.S. at
114. Although the Iowa law allowed the officer to also arrest Knowles, he only gave Knowles a
citation. Id. Without probable cause and Knowles’ consent, the officer proceeded to conduct a full
search of the car and found a bag of marijuana and a “pot pipe.” Id.
174. Id. at 116-17.
175. Id. at 113.
176. The only other liberal Fourth Amendment decision written by Rehnquist after becoming
Chief Justice, and discussed later, is Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
177. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
178. Id. at 374. The defendant, Joseph Pringle, was riding in the backseat when the car he was
in was pulled over for speeding during the early morning hours. Id. at 368. The officer noticed a
wad of money when the driver opened the glove compartment for the car’s registration. Id. The
officer ordered a full search and found cocaine. Id. The officer then informed the individuals in the
car that he would arrest all of them if no one admitted to owning the drugs; no one confessed, and
all were arrested. Id. At the police station, and after waiving Miranda, Pringle confessed ownership
of the narcotics but later asserted that police lacked probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 369.
179. Id. at 374.
180. Id.
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the drugs.181 Thus, according to Rehnquist and the Court’s majority, the
police had probable cause to believe Pringle himself had committed a
crime.182
In the 2003-2004 Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion
in the car search case of Thornton v. United States (2004).183 The Court
held that a police officer could search a car incident to a valid arrest even
if the officer makes contact with the car’s occupant after the person has
exited the car.184 Extending the logic of New York v. Belton,185 the
majority held that search of the car under these conditions is still
permissible under the Fourth Amendment.186 Rehnquist was persuaded
that the officer was concerned for his safety and needed to preserve
evidence, satisfying the historical criteria of the “search incident to a
valid arrest” exception to the warrant requirement.187 While Rehnquist
maintained that a traffic citation as precedent to a warrantless search in
Knowles v. Iowa was unconstitutional, the arrest in Thornton preserved
the warrantless search as constitutional.
It is not our intent to minimize that distinction, yet it is difficult to
reconcile fully the logic of the two cases. If concern for officer safety
and preservation of evidence are the principle justifications for an
exception to the search warrant requirement, it should follow that when
an individual remains in his car, arrested or not, and is arguably just as
or more capable of harming an officer and destroying evidence than an
individual who has left his car, the same warrant exception should apply.
Despite this logic, Rehnquist and the majority in Thornton expressed
concern that an individual who is not near his car may obtain weapons
from the car or destroy evidence in the car justifying a full warrantless
search of the car. Lastly, in Maryland v. Wilson, the Court allowed
police officers to order passengers to exit the vehicle during traffic stops
until the completion of the search.188
The possible access to weapons again in part prompted the Chief
Justice’s opinion for the Court in Muehler v. Mena.189 Here, Mena

181. Id. at 373.
182. Id. at 374.
183. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
184. Id. at 619.
185. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). There the Court articulated the position that
upon making a valid arrest of a car’s occupant a police officer may search the passenger
compartment of the car. Id. at 462-63.
186. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 616.
187. Id. at 622- 24.
188. Maryland v. Pringle, 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
189. Muehler v. Mena, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005). In Muehler v. Mena, police officers obtained a
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argued that his detention during the execution of a search warrant was
unconstitutional.190 The officers’ presumption that weapons were on the
premises was a factor in the Court’s rejection of Mena’s Fourth
Amendment claim.191 While no justice dissented, the concurring
opinions expose the justices’ concerns regarding police tactics.192
The Court handed down a number of rulings dealing with the
constitutional limitations placed on customs officials and border patrol.
As noted, before becoming Chief Justice, Rehnquist wrote the decision
in United States v. Peltier (1975),193 which held that a court ruling
requiring probable cause before a border search would not apply
retroactively.194 As Associate Justice, he also authored the Court’s
decision in United States v. Ramsey (1977)195 finding as constitutional
the warrantless search of international mail by customs officials.196 Once
Chief Justice, Rehnquist’s decisions regarding border stops and the
activities of customs officials continued to limit the reach and scope of
the Fourth Amendment.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s decisions appear to be more restrictive of Fourth
Amendment rights. In one post-September 11th case, United States v.
Flores-Montano,197 the Court ruled that border patrol can
constitutionally conduct routine searches even absent reasonable
suspicion.198 Writing for the majority, Rehnquist found that a routine
stop encompassed the removal and search of a gas tank.199 The
defendant argued that the Fourth Amendment requires the presence
reasonable suspicion for a border patrol search.200 Making note of the
warrant to look for weapons and gang related material in the home where Iris Mena resided. Id. at
1468. While executing the warrant, police handcuffed the residents and detained them in the garage;
Mena was handcuffed for two to three hours. Id. at 1468-71.
190. Id. at 1470-71.
191. Id. at 1469.
192. See id. at 1472-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1473-77 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy expressed his worry that police might interpret this as encouraging the routine
practice of handcuffing during searches. See id. at 1472 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer preferred that the lower courts determine the appropriateness
of the length of time that Mena was handcuffed. Id. at 1477 (Stevens, J., concurring).
193. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). See also supra notes 98-105 and
accompanying text (examining this decision).
194. Id. at 542.
195. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
196. Id. at 624-25.
197. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
198. Id. at 155-56.
199. Id. at 155-56.
200. Id. at 151.
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lower expectation of privacy at the borders, Rehnquist found most
border searches to be constitutional.201 Consequently, the dismantling
and reassembling of a gas tank in Flores-Montano did not constitute a
significant deprivation of property.202 The Court and Rehnquist found
that suspicion-less, routine searches at the border are constitutional.203
Other cases support the assessment that Rehnquist regarded border
searches to be less constitutionally protected than other types of
searches. In United States v. Arvizu (2002),204 Rehnquist and the
majority upheld the reasonable suspicion requirement for investigatory
stops and warrantless searches of vehicles at the borders, but held the
reasonable suspicion may arise from the “totality of the
circumstances.”205 The Ninth Circuit held that border patrol lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and overturned the defendant’s
Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 207 Rehnquist
conviction.206
argued that the Ninth Circuit had erroneously considered the
circumstances triggering the search as individual factors; examining all
the circumstances together the High Court determined that the totality of
the circumstances justified the search.208 The Court also found
reasonable suspicion under a totality of circumstances approach to
uphold the constitutionality of airport searches in United States v.
Sokolow.209 Finally, in Unites States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (1990), Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion declined to apply the Fourth
Amendment to searches of property owned by individuals who are not
U.S. citizens and located in another country.210
The Court again examined reasonable suspicion under a totality of
circumstances analysis to uphold the search of the possessions of an
individual on probation in United States v. Knights (2001). 211 Justice

201. Id. at 155-56.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002). Here, the border patrol stopped Ralph
Arvizu by the border patrol and found with substantial quantities of marijuana. Id. at 272.
205. Id. at 277-78.
206. Id. at 272-73.
207. Id. at 278.
208. Id. at 273-74.
209. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
210. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). However, the limitations
discussed in Verdugo-Urquidez did not pertain to border patrol searches. Id.
211. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). Mark Knights had agreed, as a condition
of probation, to submit to warrantless searches of his residence if officers had reasonable suspicion
to believe Knights engaged in illegal activity. Id. at 114. During probation, Knights came under
suspicion for vandalism, and consequently, the police searched his home without a warrant but
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Rehnquist’s majority opinion held the search in Knights to be
constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment because
reasonable suspicion balanced with the probation condition was
sufficient to justify the police action.212
The Court defined the privacy rights of individuals who are visiting
another’s home in Minnesota v. Carter (1998);213 brief presence in
another’s home does not create the same privacy expectations as would
an overnight stay or residence.214 Although Rehnquist acknowledged
that residents and overnight visitors of a home have some privacy
expectations, he held that the defendants here did not have privacy
expectations because they were present with the consent of the home’s
resident.215 Moreover, because the men were involved in commercial
activity, the Constitution reduced the level of privacy afforded to
them.216 In short, Rehnquist and the majority concluded that temporary
guests do not have the same privacy expectations as the homeowners.217
We end this section with Bond v. United States (2000),218 perhaps
the most surprising Rehnquist decision dealing with the Fourth
Amendment. The defendant here moved to have evidence suppressed
arguing that the border patrol officer violated his Fourth Amendment
rights during a routine bus search by “squeeze[ing] the soft luggage”
without reasonable suspicion.219 That is, Bond claimed that the random,
physical manipulation of luggage by agents without any individualized
suspicion constituted an unreasonable search.220 Writing for the
majority, Rehnquist agreed,221 handing down a surprisingly liberal
ruling. Rehnquist found that Bond had a reasonable expectation of
supported by the probation agreement. Id. Upon finding bomb-making materials, the police arrested
Knights, who subsequently moved to suppress the evidence. Id. at 115-16.
212. Id. at 121-22.
213. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998). Here, a police officer looking through a gap in
the window blinds observed Wayne Carter and Melvin Johns dividing up cocaine and placing the
drugs into bags. Id. at 85. After their arrest, the defendants attempted to have the evidence against
them suppressed, arguing that their Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. Id. at 86.
214. Id. at 91.
215. Id. at 89-91.
216. Id. at 90-91.
217. Id.
218. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). In Bond, U.S. Border Patrol boarded a
Greyhound bus and squeezed soft (e.g., canvassed) luggage located in the overhead rack above the
passengers. Id. at 336. In one duffle bag, the officer felt a brick-like object. Id. The owner of the
duffle bag, Steven Bond, consented to a search of the bag in which the officer found
methamphetamine. Id.
219. Id. at 335, 336-37.
220. Id. at 336.
221. Id.
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privacy when he placed his luggage in the overhead rack, and thus, the
officer had violated his Fourth Amendment rights.222 In the opinion,
Rehnquist conceded that passengers who place luggage in an overhead
compartment expect that others will touch and perhaps even move the
luggage, but held that the officer’s physical manipulation of the luggage
was more intrusive than simply moving the luggage and thus violated
Bond’s right to privacy.223 Bond’s use of an opaque bag indicates that
he did intend to keep the contents of his luggage private and expected
that others would not feel his bag in an “exploratory” matter.224 The
decision seems to run counter to most of the other outcomes chronicled
here. Others have noted that the Rehnquist Court “has placed the Fourth
Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures at the
bottom”225 of its list of priorities. Such an assessment holds here even in
this limited analysis reaching only those Fourth Amendment opinions
written by the Chief Justice. Especially in the context of stops by Border
Patrol, the Court and Rehnquist have repeatedly favored the ability of
law enforcement to search without probable cause and have consistently
identified reasonable suspicion based on a totality of the circumstances.
The Bond outcome, then, is highly unusual and was unanticipated by
many Court watchers.226
B. Fifth Amendment Right Against Self Incrimination
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Dickerson v. United
States227 also surprised many228 by upholding the necessity for the police
to inform suspects of their Miranda229 rights. For most of his career,
Rehnquist voted relatively consistently to increase law enforcement’s
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 337-38.
Id.
Id. at 339.
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 4 (3rd ed. 1993).
226. Christopher Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1999-2000 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 77
N.D. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2001).
227. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
228. As discussed infra, Dickerson involves the constitutionality of a congressional attempt to
restore the case-by-case analysis of a confession’s voluntariness following the Court’s rejection of
this approach with Miranda two years earlier. See Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 251-52. While
this case stands out as contrary to most of Rehnquist’s decisions and votes regarding Miranda, the
decision is consistent with Rehnquist’s view that Congress may not interpret the Constitution. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1997). As such, the ruling in Dickerson may well
be more about maintaining absolute judicial supremacy and less about upholding Miranda.
Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 256.
229. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ability to question and search suspects. While a member of the Court,
under both Chief Justice Burger and during his years as Chief Justice,
Rehnquist contributed to the creation of numerous exceptions to
Miranda rights such that some claim that Miranda rights now serve only
as “hollow symbols” of prior Court doctrine.230 In this section, we
chronicle Rehnquist’s major protection against self-incrimination
opinions231 and in so doing, we further illustrate the uniqueness of
Dickerson.
1. Decisions Written While Associate Justice
Justice Rehnquist’s views on the importance of Miranda became
fairly clear in a majority opinion he wrote very early in his career.232 In
Michigan v. Tucker, police questioned a rape suspect after providing the
suspect with an incomplete Miranda warning.233 On appeal, the
defendant argued that his Fifth Amendment rights had been violated by
the inclusion of the statements from an alibi witness idenitifed by the
suspect during his questioning and, thus, these statements should be
excluded.234 In an opinion written by Rehnquist, the High Court
disagreed and upheld Tucker’s conviction.235 The Court ruled that, while
the application of Miranda at the trial was appropriate, police conduct
during the actual questioning did not violate Tucker’s self incrimination

230. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 21112 (2nd ed. 1990).
231. To clarify, in this section we cover only Miranda rights and the Fifth Amendment right
against self incrimination. We do not, for instance, cover basic due process questions or questions
regarding the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. Rehnquist has written a substantial
number of opinions in double jeopardy cases. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978);
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985); Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984);
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982); Albernaz v.
United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), overruled by
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United
States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992); and Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
232. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974).
233. Id. at 436. The case involved an indigent offender suspected of rape. Id. During police
questioning and upon informing police that he did not want an attorney present, defendant Tucker
answered several of the police’s questions and named an alibi witness. Id. at 436-37. Police
informed Tucker that his answers could be used against him in a court of law, but police did not
inform him that he was entitled to an attorney at trial even if he could not pay for one. Id. at 436.
The alibi witness provided by Tucker contradicted his story, and police charged Tucker with rape.
Id. The initial police questioning occurred before the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona,
but his trial occurred post-Miranda. Id. at 437. At trial, while the trial judge excluded Tucker’s own
confession, he allowed the alibi witness to testify against Tucker and Tucker was found guilty. Id.
234. Id. at 437-39.
235. Id. at 452.
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rights because the police only departed from the “prophylactic standards
later laid down in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.”236 Therefore,
the fruits of an interrogation absent Miranda need not be suppressed.237
The decision in Tucker indicates an early attempt by Rehnquist and
the majority to limit the reach of the Miranda ruling. Perhaps the
language and discussion of the reach and impact of Miranda are the
most interesting aspects of the case and Rehnquist’s decision in Tucker.
Rehnquist argued that Miranda did not establish any Constitutional rules
and that the Constitution did not protect the warnings themselves.238
Rather, the Miranda warnings were merely judicially constructed
methods to guide the police during the interrogation process.239
According to Rehnquist’s reading of Miranda, “these procedural
safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but
were instead measures to insure that the right against self-incrimination
was protected.”240
The second major case limiting the scope of Miranda written by
Justice Rehnquist before his elevation to Chief comes in New York v.
Quarles241 in 1984. In New York v. Quarles, the Court articulated the
“public safety” exception to Miranda.242 Recovering a gun from the
location indicated by a rape suspect, the police arrested the suspect, and
Mirandized him; after receiving the Miranda warnings, the defendant
admitted ownership of the gun.243 Quarles argued at trial that because he
made his original statement that the “gun was over there” without the
benefit of Miranda and because the subsequent statement were tainted
by the original statement, both statements should be excluded.244 The
trial court agreed and excluded both statements in a ruling upheld by the
New York Court of Appeals.245 The United States Supreme Court

236. Id. at 446.
237. Id. at 452.
238. Id. at 444.
239. Id. at 443.
240. Id. at 444.
241. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
242. Id. at 655-56. Here, a woman claiming to have just been raped approached police. Id. at
651. One of the officers spotted Benjamin Quarles and because Quarles matched the description
given by the alleged rape victim, the officer approached Quarles. Id. at 652. Quarles ran but was
apprehended quickly by the officer. Id. When the officer frisked Quarles, he noted an empty gun
holster and asked Quarles about the location of the gun. Id. Quarles replied, “The gun is over there”
and pointed in the direction of the gun. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 652-53.
245. Id. at 653.
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reversed.246
In the opinion, Rehnquist created a “public safety” exception to
Miranda.247 He noted that concern for the public safety must supersede
the prophylactic rules established by Miranda.248 Rehnquist noted that
police officers can distinguish between situations in which the Miranda
rights can be read and those situations creating emergencies that must be
addressed, and, thus, can be addressed, without the benefit of
Miranda.249 In the case at hand, Rehnquist noted that the officers were
reasonably concerned that the abandoned gun might have been used by
an accomplice and thus the concern for the public safety was more vital
than a reading of Miranda in these types of cases.250 Rehnquist seems to
have viewed Miranda as a procedure that can be ignored or at least
delayed based on circumstances and not as a broad, constitutional right
that always warrants primacy. Rehnquist stated in the opinion,
[W]e conclude today that there are limited circumstances where the
judicially imposed strictures of Miranda are inapplicable.
...
Today, we merely reject the only argument that the respondent has
raised to support the exclusion of his statement, that the statement must
be presumed compelled because of Officer Kraft’s failure to read him
his Miranda warnings.251

Rehnquist’s opinions in Tucker and Quarles illustrate his
preference for limiting the scope of Miranda and/or the Fifth
Amendment. While these are two major ‘pre-Chief Justice’ cases, they
are not his only decisions to expand law enforcement abilities under the
Fifth Amendment. For instance, specific to Miranda and writing for the
majority, Rehnquist concluded in Wainwright v. Sykes252 that defendants
may not claim for the first time in post-conviction proceedings that they
had not understood the Miranda warnings.253 Rehnquist also wrote
several opinions for cases dealing with interpretations of the selfincrimination clause in general and repeatedly held for law enforcement
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 659-60.
Id. at 655-56.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 655-56.
Id.
Id. at 653 n.3 and 655 n.5.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
Id. at 84.
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officials and for an interpretation that eased constitutional restrictions
posed by the Fifth Amendment. For a five-member majority in Allen v.
Illinois,254 Rehnquist held that the testimony of psychiatrists made
during a person’s involuntary commitment proceedings did not violate
the Fifth Amendment.255 The case involved the confinement of sexual
predators in Illinois.256 The High Court ruled that the proceedings were
civil and not criminal and that the state’s purpose for commitment was
treatment and not punishment.257 Thus, the privilege against selfincrimination does not apply in civil confinement proceedings.258
Similarly, in United States v. Ward,259 Rehnquist wrote that the use of
reports to access monetary civil penalties does not violate the Fifth
Amendment’s self-incrimination clause because the case did not involve
a criminal prosecution.260 Finally, in United States v. Apfelbaum,261
Rehnquist concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use
of statements made under immunity to a grand jury in a subsequent
prosecution for providing false testimony to the grand jury.262 Again,
the pattern is strong; in these cases Rehnquist limited the scope of the
Fifth Amendment and increased the ability of law enforcement and
judicial officers to arrest and convict suspected criminals.263
2. Decisions Written While Chief Justice
As Chief Justice, Rehnquist’s commitment to limiting the
applicability of the Fifth Amendment is equally clear in spite of his
opinion in Dickerson v. U.S. 264 (detailed later). A few months after
becoming Chief Justice, Rehnquist wrote the opinion in Colorado v.
Connelly.265 The majority ruled in Connelly that, absent evidence of
police misconduct, a mentally ill person’s confession can be deemed
254. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
255. Id. at 372-73.
256. Id. at 365-66.
257. Id. at 373.
258. The dissenters note that the civil confinement and criminal prosecution procedures were
virtually identical and that civil confinement was punitive, and therefore, the Fifth Amendment does
apply. Id. at 375-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
260. Id. at 248-49.
261. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1979).
262. Id. at 131.
263. Rehnquist also wrote the Court’s opinions in United States v. Valenzula-Bernal, 458 U.S.
858 (1982), and Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972). Both cases deal with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.
264. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
265. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
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voluntary.266 At trial a mentally ill defendant sought to have his initial
statements suppressed.267 The psychiatrist who examined Connelly
informed the trial court that, while Connelly was experiencing a
psychotic breach, he was able to understand and waive his Miranda
rights.268 However, the psychiatrist further testified that Connelly’s
psychosis most likely motivated him to confess.269 Given this testimony,
the court ruled that Connelly’s mental condition precluded his ability to
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and his statements were
excluded.270
Writing for the majority, Rehnquist reversed, noting that proof of
police coercion is necessary to determine that a confession was not
voluntary and that the mere taking of a statement from a defendant does
not constitute a violation of due process.271 Arguing that the historical
basis for excluding involuntary statements was to prohibit police
misconduct, Rehnquist concluded that, “Absent police conduct casually
related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any
state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.”272
He goes on to note: “Only if we were to establish a brand new
constitutional right—the right of a criminal defendant to confess to his
crimes only when totally rational and properly motivated—could
respondent’s present claim be sustained.”273 It is clear from Connelly
that Rehnquist viewed the exclusionary rule as applied to the Fifth
Amendment as only relevant when the police actively participate in
getting the defendant to confess, and, it is rather limited absent a finding
of police misconduct. Police action does not lead necessarily to the
exclusion of evidence. Rather, Rehnquist states that, “Even where there
is a causal connection between police misconduct and a defendant’s
confession, it does not automatically follow that there has been a
violation of the Due Process Clause.”274 This interpretation nearly
parallels Rehnquist’s views on search and seizure protections.

266. Id. at 159.
267. Id. at 161. Francis Connelly approached a police officer in Denver and immediately began
confessing to murder. Id. at 160. The morning after being taken to police headquarters and detailing
several elements of the crime, Connelly claimed that “voices” in his head had made him confess.
Id. at 161.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 162.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 171.
272. Id. at 164.
273. Id. at 166.
274. Id. at 164.
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Regarding the Fourth Amendment, as noted supra, Rehnquist saw the
exclusion of evidence as a measure to ensure proper police conduct
rather than a constitutional right or guaranteed remedy.
A series of cases in the 1980s and early 1990s further indicates
Rehnquist’s preference for the expansion of police authority over civil
liberties and individual rights. For instance, in Connecticut v. Barrett,275
the majority held that the Fifth Amendment allowed a defendant’s postMiranda statements asserting that he would speak about a crime, but not
make a written statement outside the presence of an attorney.276 There,
the state Supreme Court ruled that, by refusing to make a written
statement, the defendant had invoked his right to an attorney.277
Consequently, and although the defendant had agreed to make verbal
statements without an attorney present, the statements were
inadmissible.278 Rehnquist, in reversing, found that the defendant
knowingly waived his right against self-incrimination and the police had
simply honored the defendant’s intention to speak.279
In Duckworth v. Eagan,280 Rehnquist and the majority held that
police do not have to give the Miranda warnings exactly as stated in the
Miranda decision.281 Instead, the Illinois police did not err when they
informed a suspect that a lawyer would be appointed to him “if and
when you go to court” even though this statement does not make it clear
to defendants that they have a right to an attorney during questioning as
well.282
Consistent with Rehnquist’s other statements regarding
Miranda, he again noted that the warnings were nothing more than
procedural safeguards.283
Finally, in Brecht v. Abrahamson,284 the Court held, in another
decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that an individual’s silence
post-Miranda can be used to impeach the defendant’s statements during
trial.285 The High Court found the prosecution’s use of the defendant’s
275. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
276. Id. at 530.
277. Id. at 526–27.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 530.
280. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
281. Id. at 200-01.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 202-03.
284. Brecht v. Gordon, 507 U.S. 619 (1992).
285. Id. at 639. The defendant, Todd Brecht, was accused of first-degree murder and made no
statements to explain his actions during post-Miranda questioning, but claimed during the trial that
the shooting was an accident. Id. at 624-25. The prosecution noted on a number of occasions that
the defendant had made no reference to this accident during pretrial statements, effectively arguing
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silence as evidence of guilt error harmless and denied the defendant
federal habeas relief.286
The unmistakable pattern emerging from these cases and from
several other votes by Rehnquist during his years on the Court is one of
a consistently conservative posture when dealing with the rights of the
criminally accused. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in
Dickerson v. U.S.287 is both surprising and interesting. Many observers
did not predict the outcome in Dickerson. One reporter recalls that she
was convinced she had heard the Miranda rights for the last time when
Rehnquist announced that he was handing down the Court’ s majority
decision.288 Dickerson addressed a 1968 congressional attempt to limit
the reach of the Miranda v. Arizona289 decision arrived at by the Warren
Court two years earlier. Following Miranda, Congress enacted 18
U.S.C. § 3501,290 which mandated that, in federal criminal prosecutions,
the admissibility of a suspect’s confession would turn on whether the
confession was given voluntarily, considering the totality of the
circumstances under which the suspect confessed.291 The federal law did
not mandate any pre-interrogation, Miranda-type warnings and, thus, it
effectively sought to overturn the Miranda ruling as applied to federal
prosecutions.292
In Dickerson, the defendant sought to have a statement he made to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation suppressed because he had not been
Mirandized.293 Reviewing Dickerson’s conviction for bank robbery, the
District Court suppressed the statement; the Appeals Court reversed,
arguing that because Miranda was not a constitutional holding, but
rather a set of procedural guidelines aimed at directing police behavior,
Congress could alter the reach of the ruling by statute.294
In the Court’s strong 7-to-2 opinion, Rehnquist reversed the
Appeals Court, invalidating Section 3501.295 Rehnquist began by noting
that Miranda was a constitutional decision,296 a position contrary to

that the defendant’s silence was evidence of his guilt. Id. at 625.
286. Id. at 639.
287. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
288. Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 251-52.
289. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
290. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
291. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
292. 18 USCS § 3501(1968).
293. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 438.
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many of his written statements regarding Miranda over the years.297
Rehnquist held that Congress may not attempt to overturn the Court’s
constitutional decision by mere statute.298 Rather, Congress may engage
in legislative action to protect an individual’s right against coercive selfincrimination, but in so doing it must guarantee that any legislative
action be at least as effective in informing individuals of their rights as
Miranda. Congress essentially overturned the Miranda requirement
through Section 3501 by allowing for voluntary confessions absent
Miranda if the totality of the circumstances indicated that the person’s
confession was voluntary. The Court ruled the legislative end-run to
circumvent the protections in federal court to be unconstitutional.299
Dickerson appears to be another case in which Rehnquist felt a
need to rein in Congress and to reassert judicial authority. Perhaps his
desire to protect the institutional security of the Court surpassed his
possible desire to overturn Miranda. Regardless, the presumed need to
redefine Miranda lessened over time. While Rehnquist had long
disagreed with the Miranda decision, the protections it afforded had
become so diluted by exceptions generated by both the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts that they no longer restricted police to the extent
originally envisioned. Rehnquist also pointed to stare decisis for not
overturning Miranda itself.300 Acknowledging that while some members
of the Court may question the wisdom of Miranda or would have
decided it differently, Rehnquist asserted that the principle of stare
decisis cautioned strongly against overturning it.301 Dickerson stands as
the only major decision dealing with the Fifth Amendment written by
Rehnquist that results in a liberal outcome, albeit based on motivations

297. Id. at 432. One could fairly surmise from the cases cited previously that Rehnquist
viewed the Miranda warnings simply as procedural devices used by police to help ensure the
mandates of the Fifth Amendment had not been violated. Thus, his initial statement that Miranda
was a constitutional decision is surprising if considered alone, but not if evaluated in the context of
the full opinion.
298. Id. at 437.
299. Rehnquist pointed to another recent Court case, City of Boerne v. Flores that intended to
keep Congress in check. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-21 (1997). Flores overruled
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress’ response to the Court’s decision in Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In order to provide a
higher level of protection for religious freedoms, Congress passed the Act, lowering the standard of
review for religious freedom from strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny. The Supreme Court
rejected Congress’ attempt to legislate the Court’s standard of review in Flores, noting strongly that
the Supreme Court had the right to “say what the law is.” Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 (quoting Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch at 177).
300. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
301. Id.
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other than a singular desire to protect individual rights and liberties.302
Although this discussion focuses on the actual opinions of Chief
Justice Rehnquist, he also had considerable influence on other
conservative members of the Court.303 While his impact is most clear in
federalism cases,304 the Chief Justice’s conservative positions likely
drive the Court’s general support of police policies and narrowing of
individual rights. Rehnquist’s influence over the moderate justices
seems to have waned in his last few years, with his own philosophies at
times too conservative to garner support from a majority of the Court.
For example, during the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 Terms collectively,
Justice Rehnquist was in the majority in all eleven criminal justice 5-to-4
decisions resulting in a conservative outcome but was in the minority in
all nine of the 5-to-4 cases that ended in liberal decisions.305
C. Cases Limiting Congressional Control Over Criminal Justice Issues
The revival of federalism cases, and especially outcomes favoring
states’ rights, promises to be one of the major legacies of the Rehnquist
Court and the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist.306 Because we only
concentrate on criminal justice cases here, we will not chronicle all of
the decisions that attempt to limit Congressional power, either through
invalidating Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause or through

302. Rehnquist also wrote several other decisions dealing with the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against self incrimination and due process clause. See United States v. Robinson, 485
U.S. 25 (1988); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407
(1990); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); DeMore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
303. Judicial scholars commonly hold that a justice’s decision on how to vote is affected by his
or her values, attitudes and the strategic choices the justice makes in attempts to persuade colleagues
or to otherwise advance a particular interpretation or doctrine. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT,
THE CHOICE JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
304. Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 251-52.
305. See also Smith, McCall & McCall, supra note 64, at 123.
306. Political scientist Sue Davis writes that federalism is at the top of Rehnquist’s judicial
values. Davis writes:
The federalism that Rehnquist places at the apex of his hierarchy of values entails a
vision of the relationship between the federal government and the states that is
fundamentally at odds with the view that prevailed on the Court from the late 1930s until
the mid-1970s. A commitment to shift power away from the federal government toward
more extensive, independent authority for the states underlies Rehnquist’s decision
making. . .Not only has he interpreted Congress’s enumerated power in a restricted way,
but he has also maintained that even when Congress acts pursuant to its enumerated
powers, it transgresses its constitutional limits when it infringes on state autonomy.
SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 149 (1989) (quoted in Greenhouse, supra
note 16, at 259). What is interesting to note here is that Professor Davis comes to this conclusion
before recent, major federalism decisions like those in Lopez and Morrison.
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application of the Tenth or Eleventh307 Amendments.308 In this section
we analyze only those cases written by Rehnquist that limit
congressional control in criminal justice cases.
As previously discussed, Dickerson v. United States309 provides us
with a good understanding of Rehnquist’s view of the role of Congress
in relationship to the judiciary. His views on the proper role of the
national government in the federalism system as related strictly to
criminal justice cases is evident in his opinions in U.S. v. Lopez (1995)310
and U.S. v. Morrison (2000),311 and in his votes in U.S. v. Printz312 and
Gonzales v. Raich (2005).313 Perhaps the most interesting of these is
U.S. v. Lopez because the case marked the first time in fifty years that
the Court asserted that Congress had exceeded its powers under the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.314
Alfonso Lopez was a 12th-grade student when he knowingly
brought a firearm to school.315 Lopez was charged with violating the
Gun-Free School Zones Act316 of 1990, a federal statute making it a
crime to carry a gun within 1000 feet of a school.317 Congress passed
the statute under its powers to regulate interstate commerce.318 However,
as the majority noted, Congress did not indicate in the legislative record
how and why guns in schools affect interstate commerce.319 Writing for
a five-member majority in what would be the first major case in a long
line of 5-to-4 conservative federalism decisions,320 Rehnquist declared
307. For instance, Rehnquist writes for the majority in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996). “Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority
over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by
private parties against unconsenting States.” Id. at 72.
308. Rehnquist’s dedication to the principle of states’ rights has been clear since the beginning
of his years on the Court, and as Chief Justice, he was able to guide the Court through a period of
time in which states won many of the federalism cases before the Bench. See discussion in EPSTEIN
& WALKER, supra note 3, at 319-447 (2004).
309. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
310. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
311. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
312. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
313. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005).
314. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
315. Id. at 551.
316. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988).
317. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
318. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A).
319. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
320. As suggested earlier, there are several interesting cases that indicate Rehnquist’s early
commitment to states’ rights, articulated first in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), and in his
dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), continues throughout
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the Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional because Congress
exceeded its powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause.321 In the
opinion Rehnquist held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act addresses
criminal behaviors that are unrelated to either commerce or economic
activity.322 Moreover, although, or perhaps, because Congress failed in
its briefs to the Court to make any specific finding regarding what
influence guns in school have on commerce,323 government attorneys
orally argued that the cost of violent crimes was substantial, that violent
crime might reduce individuals’ willingness to travel to areas perceived
unsafe, and that guns at school would threaten the educational progress
and create a less productive work force.324 Rehnquist found none of
these arguments convincing, stating that, if Congress were allowed to
regulate guns in schools, Congress would be able to “regulate not only
all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime,
regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.”325
Finally, in a rather harsh statement, Rehnquist wrote that, in order for the
Supreme Court to find the Gun-Free School Zones Act constitutional,
they would have to “pile inference upon inference in a manner that
would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the commerce
clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”326 If
the Court were to do this, Rehnquist warned, “there will never be a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”327
The case represents a substantial departure from a long line of
Court doctrine stemming from the New Deal era and Wickard v.
Filburn328 to uphold congressional action.329 The Court had for fifty
years adopted a much lower standard that tended to defer to
congressional judgment as to whether significant or substantial influence

his career. Most of the federalism cases decided post-Lopez are 5-to-4 conservative outcomes, with
the majority consisting of Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O’Connor and the minority
consisting of Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens. The Court’s recent decision in Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005), varies considerably from the pattern. See infra notes 355-60
(discussing this analysis in Gonzales).
321. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 553.
324. Id. at 563.
325. Id. at 564.
326. Id. at 567.
327. Id. at 567-68.
328. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
329. See Lee Epstein & Thomas Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America:
Institutional Powers and Constraints, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 319-447 (2004).
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on commerce existed.330 As the dissenters noted, the ruling threatened
legal doctrine that had seemed settled.331 While certainly Lopez came as
a surprise to many Court observers, the ruling in Lopez is consistent with
Rehnquist’s views of states’ rights first articulated in a majority opinion
in National League of Cities v. Usery.332 When Garcia v. San Antonia
Metropolitan Transit Authority333 overturned Usery nine years later,
Rehnquist predicted correctly that his view of federalism and preference
for state’s rights would “again command the support of a majority of this
court.”334
Initially, observers argued that perhaps Lopez represented an
attempt by Rehnquist and the majority to chastise Congress for not
articulating the link between commerce and their statutory activities,335
and thus, when Congress properly explicated the rationale for the
legislation, the Court would reverse course. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
decision in U.S. v. Morrison (2000),336 would quickly dispel any belief
that the principles articulated in Lopez were so limited.337 In Morrison,
the Court reviewed the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(VAWA).338 Congress passed VAWA under its power to regulate
330. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 137.
331. Id.
332. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). National League of Cities and Garcia are both
decided on Tenth Amendment grounds and not commerce. Nevertheless, Rehnquist’s views on the
importance of states’ rights are clear.
333. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
334. Id. at 580.
335. EPSTEIN & WALKER 2004, supra note 3, at 453.
336. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
337. Although Morrison is not a criminal justice case, but rather concerns an attempt by
Congress to allow for civil prosecutions of criminal actions, it is included here as an excellent
example of Rehnquist’s decision making tendencies. While Rehnquist’s commitment to the
principles of states’ rights is evident, Greenhouse notes that one of his major accomplishments is the
molding of other Court members to his position. See Greenhouse, supra note 16. Greenhouse
argues that by allowing others to write the opinions in federalism cases, Rehnquist served as a
mentor, a role for which he often is not credited. See id. Because he tended to parcel out the
authorship duties in federalism cases, he wrote the opinion in a limited number of such cases. This
underscores the importance of Morrison and further warrants the case’s inclusion here.
338. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. In the fall of 1994, Antonio Morrison and James Crawford
allegedly raped Christy Brzonkala, then a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Id. at 602.
Later, Brzonkala was unable to attend classes despite having sought professional help and withdrew
from the university. Id. at 602-03. Brzonkala filed a complaint against both Morrison and Crawford
under the university’s sexual assault policy. Id. at 603. The university found insufficient evidence
against Crawford but found Morrison guilty and suspended him for two semesters. Id. Upon appeal,
Morrison’s suspension was dropped and he returned to the university in the Fall of 1995. Id. at 60304. Brzonkala dropped out of the university and filed a civil rights suit under the federal Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b), against Morrison, Crawford and
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interstate commerce,339 but unlike the situation in Lopez, Congress
documented at length the relationship between interstate commerce and
gender-motivated violence.340 The question for the Court in Morrison
was the constitutionality of VAWA.
Writing for the five-person majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist used
the same logic he used in Lopez to invalidate the VAWA.341 Rehnquist
stated that gender-motivated crimes are not economic and dismissed
Congress’s documented evidence that these crimes can have a
substantial effect on commerce.342 Rehnquist acknowledged that
congressional studies present numerous reports that document the
serious impact gender-motivated crime has on victims, but asserted that
even these findings were not sufficient to uphold the legislation.343
Rehnquist chose not to defer to congressional findings and charged that
just because Congress said that gender-motivated violence is related to
interstate commerce did not make it so.344 Rehnquist maintained that it
is the Court’s responsibility to determine if certain activities have a
substantial effect on commerce.345 Consistent with his views in Lopez,
Rehnquist further wrote that if Congress were allowed to use the
Interstate Commerce Clause to regulate gender-motivated violence,346
Congress would be able to use the Commerce Clause to “completely
obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local
authority.”347 In Rehnquist’s views, upholding the VAWA would mean
Virginia Tech. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604-05. The Violence Against Women Act stated that
individuals have the right to be free of gender-motivated violent crimes and that victims of such
crimes have the right to sue their attackers in federal civil court for monetary compensation. Id. at
605.
339. Rehnquist also finds that the Violence Against Women Act is unconstitutional under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 627.
340. Id. at 614.
341. Id. at 606-08.
342. Id. at 608-09.
343. Id. at 614.
344. Clearly many in Congress have taken issue with such decisions, and some Senators have
expressed these concerns while questioning John Roberts during his confirmation hearings. For
instance, referring to Morrison and other recent instances in which the Court declared acts of
Congress unconstitutional, Senator Specter told Judge Roberts, “I take umbrage at what the court
has said, and so do my colleagues.” Linda Greenhouse, In Roberts Hearing, Specter Assails Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A1.
345. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
346. Congress found that violence against women affects interstate commerce “by deterring
potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and
from transacting with business, and in places involved in interstate commerce . . . . by diminishing
national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the
demand for interstate products.” Id. at 615.
347. Id.
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that Congress could regulate any crime and violent activity even though
the regulation of violence and crime is a state issue.348 Citing again the
power of the judiciary to interpret the Constitution and to determine
what the law is, Rehnquist clearly expressed his philosophical belief that
Congress and congressional powers needed to be reined by a more
supreme judiciary.349
Finally, although not written by Rehnquist, the Court’s disposition
of Printz v United States350 and Rehnquist’s vote in the case further
reveal his states’ rights views. Printz involved the constitutionality of
the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.351 The Court,
through an opinion by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Rehnquist,
overturned the provisions of the Brady Act which required states to
implement federal law.352 Although the dissenters argued that the
legislation was constitutionally based on provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Clause, the majority disagreed and again limited
congressional control over issues in criminal justice.353
While, as some suggest, such cases might illustrate Rehnquist’s
influence over other Court members and his willingness to allow
colleagues to write major federalism decisions,354 the Chief Justice’s
reach was limited at times. Gonzales v. Raich illustrates this
limitation.355 Here, the Court upheld Congress’s power to regulate the
production and use of medicinal marijuana under the Controlled
Substance Act.356 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that
Congress can regulate such production even if the production is intended
for private consumption and consistent with the Court’s previous
recognition of congressional power regarding the production of wheat.357
Rehnquist was in the three-member minority which, through O’Connor’s

348. Id. at 613.
349. See Greenhouse, supra note 16.
350. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
351. 18 U.S.C § 922. The Brady Bill mandated national criminal background checks for
handguns. Printz, 521 U.S. at 899-904. The law also required that until the national system of
checks could be established fully, state officials would conduct the background checks. Id. at 899.
352. Id. at 935.
353. Id.
354. See Greenhouse, supra note 16.
355. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005).
356. See id. A federal (DEA) raid leading to the destruction of cannabis plants grown for
personal consumption was valid despite a state law permitting the use of marijuana for medicinal
purposes. Id. In 1996, California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act allowing ill
Californians to use marijuana for medicinal purposes. Jeff McDonald, Supreme Court Decision
Trumps California Law, THE SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE, June 7, 2005, at A1.
357. The case held to be controlling is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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dissenting opinion, asserting that the majority opinion violated the
principles of federalism, was inconsistent with Lopez358 and Morrison,359
and had not demonstrated that the activity (i.e., growing of marijuana for
personal use) is economic in nature or that it has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.360
D. Cases Limiting Federal Habeas Corpus
One of Justice Rehnquist’s lasting legacies will be his dedication to
limiting the number of cases that qualify for federal habeas corpus
review and relief. Very early in his career, in an opinion dissenting from
the decision to grant certiorari,361 Rehnquist clarified his view that the
Supreme Court and other federal courts had allowed death row inmates
to lengthen the appeals process improperly and prolong their stay on
death row. In a strongly worded opinion, Rehnquist noted that:
I do not think that this Court can continue to evade some responsibility
for this mockery of our criminal justice system . . . What troubles me is
that this Court, by constantly tinkering with the principles laid down in
the five death penalty cases decided in 1976, together with the natural
reluctance of state and federal habeas judges to rule against an inmate
on death row, had made it virtually impossible for States to enforce
with reasonable promptness their constitutionally valid capital
punishment statutes.362

Supported by the appointment of other like-minded jurists (Justices
O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, in particular)363 and through a series of
cases over the next several years, Rehnquist and the conservative
majority became very successful in severely limiting access to the
federal courts for those seeking federal habeas review.364 Absent a few

358. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
359. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 654 (2000).
360. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2221 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
361. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 956 (1981) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 958-59.
363. Early in his career Rehnquist, of course, lacked these supporting members. For instance,
just after joining the Court, Rehnquist (and others) dissented in the landmark death penalty case,
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Justices Brennan and Marshall, both in the majority in
Furman, would continue to vote predominantly in favor of individuals’ claims in a range of issue
areas until they left the Court in 1990 and 1991, respectively. See, e.g., THOMAS R. HENSLEY,
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 57, 61 (1997).
364. An early memorial review commemorating Rehnquist’s influence, for instance, recalls
that Rehnquist “strengthened property rights and . . .[t]he Rehnquist court also made it harder for
civil rights plaintiffs, prisoners and Death Row inmates to win claims in federal courts.” Savage,
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recent rulings dealing with the quality of justice meted out specifically
by the Texas courts,365 the Court followed Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
lead.366
One of the best examples of the extent to which Justice Rehnquist
preferred to close off the federal courts to death penalty367 habeas
appeals is Herrera v. Collins (1993).368 The case dealt with an
individual convicted of the second-degree murder of two police
officers.369 Following several years of review, the defendant filed for
federal habeas relief on a claim of “actual innocence.”370 In his petition
for review, the defendant supplied the Court with two affidavits by
individuals who claimed that the defendant’s dead brother had confessed
to committing the murders.371 The federal appeals court denied the
petition for habeas relief arguing that the existence of new evidence
related to the question of the defendant’s actual guilt was not grounds
itself for federal review.372 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
agreed with the appeals court.373 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated that the refusal of the state courts to entertain claims of

supra note 27.
365. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004); Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (2005). See
Smith, McCall & McCall, supra note 64 (discussing Tennard decision).
366. Habeas relief aside, in recent years Chief Justice Rehnquist was on the dissenting end of
several high profile death penalty cases including Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2003), in which
the Court held the imposition of the death penalty for the mentally retarded to be cruel and unusual
punishment; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), in which the Court held that the imposition of
death for juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
in which the Court held that juries, not judges, must decide the aggravating factors necessary for
imposition of the death penalty; and Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (2005), in which the Court
ruled that the defendant in this particular case received ineffective assistance of counsel.
367. We do not cover Justice Rehnquist’s Eighth Amendment cases in this article, although he
has written many. Justice Rehnquist, for instance, authored opinions dealing with capital jury
instructions. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269
(1998); Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); Ross
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); and Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). Although these are not the only cases dealing with the Eighth
Amendment written by Justice Rehnquist, all of these cases deal with jury instructions in capital
cases. Last term, Chief Rehnquist wrote the Court’s opinion in Arthur Anderson v. United States,
125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005). See id. While not involving a capital charge, the case involves jury
instructions used to convict the Anderson account firm of wrongdoing as related to the downfall of
energy giant Enron. Rehnquist and the Court find that the trial judge erred in failing to convey to
the jury criteria for determining guilt. Id.
368. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
369. Id. at 393-95.
370. Id. at 400.
371. Id. at 395-97.
372. Id. at 396-98.
373. Id. at 419.
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actual innocence did not violate notions of fundamental fairness rooted
in the traditions of the American criminal justice system.374 Rehnquist
claimed that the ten years between the trial and the habeas petition
reduced the defendant’s right to federal habeas review.375 Finally,
according to the Chief Justice, the federal courts could not and should
not force state courts to evaluate claims of actual innocence.376 The case
illustrates Rehnquist’s beliefs that the appeals process for death row
inmates was far too long and that the federal courts, where possible,
should shorten the process of review.
Herrera is only one of many cases written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist that limited access to the federal courts or that placed limits
on the extent of the federal hearings by the federal courts. In the 20042005 Term, for instance, the Chief wrote for a bare majority in Pace v.
Diguglielmo.377 There the Court held that the petitioner filed for habeas
relief beyond the statute of limitations and did not show due diligence in
filing for state post-conviction relief,378 therefore time-barring federal
habeas relief.379 In Hill v. Lockhart (1985),380 Rehnquist wrote that state
prisoners are not entitled to evidentiary hearings regarding a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
In Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,381 the majority held that improper remarks
made by the prosecutor in a murder trial did not constitute cause for
habeas relief.382 In Price v. Vincent,383 the Court held that an individual
convicted of first-degree murder after his counsel had moved for a
directed verdict was not entitled to federal relief based on a double
jeopardy claim.384 The Court also restricted habeas relief in a major,
early habeas petition case written by Justice O’Connor (Coleman v.
Thompson).385 Rehnquist’s views on this point were so strong that he
publicly lobbied to limit the extent of death row appeals in his 1997
Year-End Report on the state of the federal judiciary.386 In part
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Id. at 400-03.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 405.
Pace v. Diguglielmo, 125 S.Ct. 1807 (2005) (five-to-four decision).
Id. at 1810-11.
Id. at 1814.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
Id.
Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003).
Id.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
See Judith Resnick, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources of Alternative
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reflecting these views, the Court has been very active in recent years in
limiting federal habeas relief and shortening the death row appeals
process.387
V. CONCLUSION
As the longest serving member of his Court and as the Chief Justice
for almost two decades, Chief Justice Rehnquist had a considerable
amount of influence on the direction of the law and the outcome of
Supreme Court decisions. Rehnquist provided a strong and consistent
voice in support of conservative ideologies and successfully marshaled
Court majorities for these policy preferences in numerous instances.
While his influence in federalism cases is perhaps the most notable, over
time the standards from many of Rehnquist’s earlier dissenting opinions
in criminal justice cases became the law.
Early in his career, Rehnquist made arguments suggesting that the
Supreme Court limit Miranda and exclude evidence only when police
misconduct is clear. Years later many Court decisions came to reflect
this view. The Supreme Court majority also implemented the Chief
Justice’s preference for limiting access to the federal courts. In general,
while Rehnquist was unable to have his preferences prevail in many of
the Court’s recent, most controversial decisions, his steady influence
over criminal justice cases is evident. The Court’s death penalty
opinions regarding the execution of juvenile offenders and the mentally
retarded stand out not only because they are liberal rulings on a
conservative court but also because they are among only a handful of
high profile criminal justice cases in which Rehnquist was in the
minority.
This brief review of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision—making
tendencies also reveals an aspect of the Chief’s voting patterns during
this latest natural court: he was unlikely to provide a fifth liberal vote to
the four person liberal bloc. While Justices Scalia, Thomas, O’Connor,
and Kennedy all provided swing votes in criminal justice cases litigated
before the Court since 1995, Justice Rehnquist did not do so a single
time. We find this pattern to be a very intriguing one, but we leave it to
others to speculate as to the specific reasons for this pattern. Here, we
merely note that the liberal bloc was wholly unsuccessful in obtaining
Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 82 GEO. L.J. 2589 (1998).
387. Other related cases include Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998), Stewart v.
Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998), Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996), and Gilmore v.
Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993).
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any support from Rehnquist in the closest of cases. While many believe
Justices Scalia and Thomas to be the Court’s more staunch
conservatives, Rehnquist was the justice least likely to rule in a liberal
manner in criminal justice cases decided since 1995.
Throughout his career in the issue areas addressed in this analysis,
Rehnquist may have been the quintessential “law and order” justice.
This seems to be true at least in terms of how Republican presidential
candidates first defined the “law and order” theme.388 Others followed
Goldwater and Nixon in calling for policies that would more
aggressively pursue and punish criminals, and for judges that would
reduce the perceived constraints on police. President Ronald Reagan
blamed increasing crime rates on “years of liberal leniency” in the
judiciary and elsewhere.389 The message continued, for instance, as
1996 GOP presidential nominee Robert Dole frequently bemoaned that
President William Clinton’s judicial appointees, in Dole’s opinion, were
too eager to use technicalities to overturn the convictions of
murderers.390 As some scholars have observed, such critiques of the
judiciary became “rather standard election-year political fare. Ever since
Richard M. Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign, Republican candidates
have attacked Democrats for appointing judges who are ‘soft on
criminals.’”391
In this sense, the “law and order” label seems to befit Justice
Rehnquist. As examined here, Rehnquist repeatedly voted to weaken or
rescind restrictions on police, to limit the scope of double jeopardy
protections and to reduce the accessibility of the federal courts to
prisoners seeking habeas corpus review and relief.
The “get-tough” posture was only one of at least two main themes
emerging in conservative presidential campaigns after the early 1960s.
The rhetoric of Goldwater, Nixon, and others was characterized perhaps
even more by the call for a “devolution” of federalism that would reduce
federal and enhance state powers.392
Here, too, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s voting record conforms rather well to these early, electoral
messages. His commitment to shift criminal justice and other powers
388. See, e.g., SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22.
389. David Hoffman, Reagan Stumps with Tough Line on Crime, Drunk Driving,
WASHINGTON POST, June 21, 1984, at 7.
390. Michael Tackett, Dole Fires a Salvo at Clinton, Judges: GOP Hopeful Blames Jurists for
Crime, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 20, 1996, at 1.
391. STEPHAN WAYNE, G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, DAVID M. O’BRIEN, & RICHARD L. COLE,
THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 566 (2nd ed.1997).
392. See SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 45-55 (noting the attention
that Goldwater and Nixon gave to these issue areas).
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away from the federal government and to broaden the powers enjoyed
by state governments is unmistakable.393 Perhaps Rehnquist writing the
decision in Dickerson,394 that not only upheld the Miranda warnings but
also labeled Miranda as a constitutional decision, is not as surprising as
it might have seemed at the time. Rehnquist’s motives easily could be
viewed to include the desire to reaffirm judicial supremacy in
interpreting constitutional requirements in light of a Congress that was
perceived to be encroaching on the Court’s authority. Similarly, while
Rehnquist’s decision might have allowed for guns near schools395 or
while his vote could have made it easier for felons to purchase guns,396
his actions were hardly intended to primarily favor criminal defendants.
Rather, the broader thrust of these and similar opinions as in Morrison397
was to rein in perceived intrusions by Congress into a states’ area of
influence.
We found Chief Justice Rehnquist held consistently conservative
viewpoints throughout his career in the issue areas addressed here and
was relatively successful in implementing his policy preferences.
Instances in which Rehnquist appears, at first blush, to have deviated
from this course often fit the larger pattern upon closer scrutiny. Thus,
his vote in Dickerson is consistent with his views on congressional
power within the realm of criminal justice. Whether one agrees with the
Chief Justice’s preferences or not, this analysis suggests that over the
course of his career he saw many of his preferences enacted into law and
reshaped judicial doctrine in several important areas of criminal justice.
He leaves behind a potent legacy of conservative criminal justice
decisions that in many ways marries the values of crime control and
states’ rights and that almost assuredly will leave a long-lasting imprint
on the Court.
It is difficult to predict, at this point, whether Rehnquist’s legacy
will be embodied directly by an heir on the Court. While the
jurisprudence of his successor, John Roberts,398 has been likened to that

393. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 319-447 (2004); SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE
REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
394. Dickerson v. United States 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).
395. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
396. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
397. United States v. Morrison, 539 U.S. 654 (2000).
398. Roberts was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 22, 2005 by a
vote of 13-5. See Roberts Nomination Advances, CNN NEWS (Sept. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.cnn.com. He was then confirmed by the full Senate on Sept. 29, 2005 by a vote of 7822. See Roberts Confirmed as Chief Justice, CNN NEWS (Sept. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.cnn.com.
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of Rehnquist,399 - Roberts clerked for Rehnquist400 - and although in his
confirmation hearings Roberts suggested that observers should not be
surprised if they find his interpretations to be similar to those Rehnquist
championed,401 Roberts also insisted before Senate that he was “his own
To date, Roberts’s views on federalism403 appear to
man.”402
approximate the opinions by Rehnquist favoring states’ rights, though
less has been discussed during the confirmation hearings and elsewhere
of Roberts’s specific interpretations of restrictions on law enforcement
and other criminal justice issues. While the consistency and quantity of
Rehnquist’s opinions in criminal justice cases indicate that the influence
of the late Chief Justice will continue to shape law in these areas, it is
unclear for how long precisely this will be true. The arrival of newlyappointed Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito at
the retirement of Justice O’Connor, who frequently proved critical in
determining whether Rehnquist would be in the Court’s majority or
minority,404 require that the writing of Chief Justice William Hubbs
Rehnquist’s legacy remains a work in progress.

399. For instance, Walter Dellinger, a former U.S. solicitor general, states, “It’s hard to
imagine a choice more similar to Chief Justice Rehnquist than John Roberts.” Joan Biskupic,
Roberts, Rehnquist compel comparisons, USA TODAY, Sept. 7, 2005, at 12A.
400. For a perspective outside the United States of the nomination, certain similarities between
Rehnquist and Roberts, and Roberts’s credentials, see Bush Names Roberts Top US Judge, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 5, 2005), available at http://www.news.bbc.co.uk.
401. Senate Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of John Roberts to the Position of Chief
Justice,
U.S.
Supreme
Court,
Washington
Post
(2005),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com. See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Adam Liptak, Roberts Fields
Questions on Privacy and Precedents, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005.
402. Stolberg & Liptak, supra note 399.
403. Most have held that little is yet known of Roberts’s views on a range of issues. Jonathan
Turley writes that “John Roberts may be the ultimate example of the judicial blind date.” Jonathan
Turley, Roberts: The Before and After, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.USATODAY.com. That aside, Turley offers some brief insights into Roberts’s most
likely leanings in the areas, among others, of federalism and criminal law and procedure. Id.
404. Several assessments of the Court have noted the often centrist and critical role played by
Justice O’Connor, especially in sharply divided cases. Among the more recent scholarship, see
SMITH, MCCALL & MCCLUSKEY 2005, supra note 22, at 12; Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn
& Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss2/2

50

